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SPEECH IN THE COMMUNITY OF THE CHURCH

A Dissertation
Presented to
the Faculty of the School of Theology
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In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Religion

by
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Adolf Harnack, in his History of Dogma, suggested that one reason the faith of the early Church was not quickly, precisely, and finally translated into dogmatic formulas was that history has known few men "who clearly perceived and duly appreciated the final interests which motivated themselves."¹ While this essay claims no finality, it is necessary to attempt to isolate those interests which have motivated it.

The situation this discussion comes out of is the writer's life in the Church. During those brief years two primary characteristics of church life in the local parish have become evident. First, people in the church talk of love and expect to be loved. Second, people in the church avoid conflict and prefer schism to diversity.

When people talk of love they usually have a feeling in mind. It can be described and placed within a set of moral expectations which each person applies to himself and others. Love is a primary concern for church members. And as such, the understanding of love as a

¹Adolf Harnack, History of Dogma (New York: Russell and Russell, 1958), III, p. 167.

form of human relationship is at once assumed to be ultimate and assumed to be obvious. When such an ultimate and obvious mode of relation enters a morality and becomes normative for a person's relationships, any actions which contrast or contradict this norm are suspect. When love becomes a normative element in morality it tends to become uniform due to the necessary uniformity of personal morality. The New Testament insists that love is ultimate but not uniform. Rather, love is a word which describes diverse acts which are characterized by their contribution of something to persons which they cannot provide for themselves. We become a community through each person's contribution of diversity given to another who is lacking what the lover has to give. Thus, to make love a norm in a moral system is antithetical to the diversity of persons which makes the love act possible. (See the discussion of Käsemann.)

The avoidance of conflicts by churchmen is a sign of the exclusiveness and fragility of love as a moral norm. Churches are places where everybody feels the same about everybody else. This is loving, or is it? What can we offer people besides the same feeling that everybody else has to offer? We can offer our honest diversity. The value of this offering over that of a blanket love norm is that it meets the needful pains and dilemmas of our community brothers as they face a diverse world. A

uniform love morality is always out of step with the real world because that world is not uniform but multiform. Indeed, if God really loves each of us as we are, he loves us in our diversity and not because we want to all be the same, to feel the same on Sunday mornings. But, real diversity is hard to handle for a community. When issues divide churches for a long period of time they are either suppressed or result in schism. Church hopping is a common form of our inability as churchmen to handle conflict, to even accept the reality and value it has as a reflection of honest diversity.

The problems of a love norm and conflict avoidance both come down to the more basic problem of diversity and its role in the community life of a church. The functional element in human life which most clearly reflects diversity is human speech. Diversity is reflected in a plurality of languages, local dialects, and slang expressions. But even more basic is the diverse multiformity of grammar itself. We speak about the past, present, and future by using different grammatical forms. We speak about others as persons, societies, and nations as well as our deepest inner thoughts and feelings with different grammatical forms. If we, as the Church, are going to deal honestly with diversity and thereby with real love and conflict, then we must deal honestly with the functional grammatical usages which reflect and at

times create diversity.

This is essentially an enterprise of checking the social reality in which speech is uttered with the speech itself. If the speech is appropriate to its social setting we can come together in diverse acts of love. If it does not, we must ask why it does not. Nothing is accomplished by suppressing the difference between speech and reality. The only question that must be asked is whether the speech which does not fit its reality or the social reality itself must be changed. New forms of speech may express an imminent change in the social setting in which case the speech must be left in tact. Old speech forms may be used to retard change in the social setting in which case the speech must be changed. An assumption behind this discussion is that speech and social reality can correspond.

The problem of timing is inherent in deciding whether speech and reality correspond. The time of change is interspersed between moments of maintaining the status quo of speech usages.

The above is an outline of a difficult stance. It is not a stance which absorbs all diversity in a false peace but one that sees the possibility that a specific status quo may not need changing in one case or that a radical change is required in another. Within such a stance a person who can at one time demand the preser-

vation of the status quo and at another can demand changes which are radical is being described. He is a sell-out in the eyes of both the conservative and the radical who demand submission to a specific uniformity of social and intellectual participation. The element of timing is crucial for this position. It must be conservative when it is the one thing necessary and radical when a new action is called for. The maintenance of honest diversity is the guideline. Love and speech both flourish in diversity, not in mere uniformity. The problem of this paper is diversity and multiformity within the parish community. The tool used to explore the dimensions of multiformity is speech and the usages which make up speech. Nothing less than the possibility of honest love is at stake.

Speech is problematic from both the popular and the academic perspectives. On the popular side, language and its life in vital speaking is mistrusted. We have been so imbued with the necessity of a kind of scientific objectivity that speech is considered as the imperfect representation of other human processes which can be more clearly defined than can the speech used to represent deeper human elements. One purpose of this paper is to argue that human depth and meaning are dependent upon the power of speech to create forms of intense and complex human life rather than the opposite as is popularly

supposed.

The other threat to vital speech comes from academic disciplines which are concerned with the students' learning of a critical, inner language of a specific discipline. The danger lies not in the demand itself but in the inability or lack of desire on the part of those who know the special vocabulary to hear those who do not know it. This includes the voicing of pain and protest which that discipline may inflict which may be verbalized in forms that are rejected or anathema to the orthodox vocabulary.

The question is: What is vital speech in the context of the Church? This presupposes two other questions. Why is vital speech important? What is the Church in its role as a context for speech? In answer to the first question, societies die without vital speech. This will be argued in more detail within the essay. As for the second question, the Church, it lives or dies according to the vitality of its speech perhaps more abruptly than any other institution. This change refers not only to the tenor of its preaching but also to the ability of the Church to hear the world clearly and then to speak its well considered word, or Word, to the world. This in turn demands that individual parishioners can hear each other and speak vital words. The Church is caught in a bind with its word. It cannot merely voice the popular

formulas and slogans of the time or it becomes hypocritical. It cannot become merely academic because it will be mystifying to its members and to the world. The Churchman should be the first to agonize over the question of when and where he should speak. Assumptions concerning what is vital speech that remain unanalyzed mean death by assimilation or mystification. Death is very attractive. In this case, as in all others, the Church does not merely war against bald atrocity but against the seductive loins of a slow and enjoyable death, a comfortable and secure death within anachronistic, ill-timed speech.

We have then to discuss the way in which speech establishes multiformity and thereby presents a diversity which must be recognized and valued as the ground of the possibility of love. The next chapter will be concerned with the work of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy who has discussed the way in which speech establishes human multiformity within space and time.

CHAPTER II

JUST GRAMMAR?

In this discussion of Rosenstock-Huessy we start with an essay entitled "Articulated Speech"¹ in which he discusses the dimensions of speech. If our grammatical foundation is itself a usage then it must be examined in relation to speech which is the concretization of grammar. It is the usage behind all usages. This is the reason for an examination of grammar. It would be futile to examine specific usages and test them as to their appropriateness for the situations in which they find expression unless a prior understanding of the structures in which usages are placed was also examined. Grammar is the structure in which all usages find expression. Speech is the medium in which both enter the life of a community. Therefore, the essay on "Articulated Speech" will be studied in relation to another essay entitled "Grammar as a Social Science"² in which the structure of grammar is discussed and a restructuring is proposed.

Rosenstock-Huessy outlines four basic features of speech: (1) the personal ability to speak, (2) the

¹Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, Speech and Reality (Norwich, Vermont: Argo Books, 1970), pp. 45-66.

²Ibid., pp. 98-114.

assumption of the parties of speech that a common understanding can be reached, (3) communication that takes place through formative signs (gestures and sounds), and (4) the possibility of failure which points to the risk involved in vital speech.³ This is the first level of speech in which the speech act takes place or fails. The risk in vital speech is real. Its failure can mean many things from misunderstanding to war. If one of the four aspects is thwarted, speech cannot take place in the complete form which results in communication and response.

A second level of speech is that of names and answers. There are four features to this dimension. First, names and terms tie us to the history of mankind. They stand in an unbroken line of ancestry.⁴ Second, answers can be formulated in three possible directions or forms of variation: (1) a direction toward the interlocutor; "Go...", which is a form of the second person through which we try to make another act by pronouncing an imperative, (2) an objective statement of fact, leaving the interlocutors out; "Sir," which is a form of the third person and indicatival, (3) a direction toward the answering person himself using the I-form and announcing

³Ibid., p. 46.

⁴Ibid., p. 48.

the Ego's intention which is intentional or subjunctive in form.⁵ The third and fourth features concern the relation of the person who names, or initiates the speech, and the one who answers and responds to the speech. Third, a desire is expressed which comes from inside the speaker. Fourth, conscious observation on the part of the listener makes possible an answer which comes from outside the desire of the speaker.⁶ If the process of naming and answering, speaking and responding are carried out, vital speech occurs. If the history present in the process of naming or the creation of an appropriate answer is not present then speech fails. True speech is characterized by this interplay of historical identity of the name and the variability of the answer. In this way we participate in the constant recreation of our linguistic tradition.⁷ Any breakdown of communication should be traceable back to some element in the two levels of speech.

If the above discussion of the dimensions of speech is at all on target, then it would seem that the grammatical foundation of speech will bear some specific relation to the speech it supports. But as Rosenstock-Huessy points out, the relation is not a happy one. Our

⁵Ibid., p. 49.

⁶Ibid., p. 50.

⁷Ibid., p. 49.

present understanding of grammar tends to thwart the vitality of speech.

The grammatical structure which we have inherited was formulated in ancient Alexandria and it still dominates our linguistic understanding.⁸ It runs as follows (in Latin and English).

<u>amo</u>	I love
<u>amas</u>	thou loveth
<u>amat</u>	he loves
<u>amamus</u>	we love
<u>amatis</u>	you love ⁹
<u>amant</u>	they love

What is wrong with this? Rosenstock-Huessy suggests: this.

In listing amo, amas, amat, amamus, etc., the impression is conveyed that all these sentences can and should be treated as of the same social character. The effect on any reader of such a list will be that any indicative is spoken with the same degree of emphasis. We contradict. We say that amat and amo and amas are worlds apart in social emphasis and therefore cannot be taught as homogeneous. The Alexandrian list is insincere.¹⁰

The only conclusion that is left us is that our grammatical struggle to produce vital speech is predisposed to insincerity. If this is the case, and from the writer's experience it is, then we are burdened with an unnecessary handicap in our speaking which is difficult enough as it is. Rosenstock-Huessy proposes a reordering of the grammatical list in order to make it more faithful to our

⁸Ibid., p. 98.

⁹Ibid., p. 99.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 100.

speech.

<u>ama</u>	love!
<u>ame</u>	that I may love
<u>amatus</u>	loved

In this list, each personal state, thou, I, it, they, we is identified with a special fundamental social reaction.¹¹

It is Rosenstock-Huessy's contention that grammar reflects the social situations which form the context for grammatical forms. From this position and in justification of his reformulation of grammar he attempts the proof of the two points.

1. amat is spoken without emphasis, as a fact. Amo and amas cannot be spoken without grave social consequences. Hence, they presuppose emphasis, whereas we must learn about emphasis as the social element in grammar.

2. The political qualities of our various crucial utterances can be evoked by an up-to-date grammar or they can be repressed and destroyed by the prevailing grammar. The crucial proof of 1 and 2 is furnished by the current confusion between history and science. History has an emphasis which science cannot have. History cannot be science because it requires emphasis.¹²

The method that he uses to exemplify these two points is that of describing the social presuppositions of each person of grammar. Besides the first, second, and third persons of the indicative he adds a discussion of the perfect active indicative. It is both a refinement and an example of what was earlier referred to as etymological thinking. The steps in the process of etymological

¹¹Ibid., p. 100.

¹²Ibid., pp. 100-101.

thinking are: (1) the isolation of a usage which has present life in the community, (2) a description of the situation in which it is used, the social presuppositions, (3) the comparison of the history implied in the words of the usage with the social presuppositions, and (4) given the comparison, an adjustment of the usage in its social setting or a re-education of the history of the usage may be required. The presupposition upon which the whole process of etymological thinking rests is that a community has control over its speech if it is willing to exert it. Vital speech is impossible if a community has no control over its usages. Vital and timely speech will result if a community does consciously attempt the "take-over" of its own speech. This process of take-over, the self liberation of a community and its speech, will of necessity be very painful. Usages are habitual and provide the security of predictable recurrence in predefined situations. Questions concerning usages are also questions placed against the security of established habits. Therefore, timely, vital speech is not mere iconoclasm. A usage may lie deep within the social fabric of a community and to cut one thread may be to destroy the whole cloth. The moderate is cursed with the imperative of acting at the right time. The conservative denies the effect of time upon his understanding. The radical assumes the now is the time that has never been before and we must seize

it. It is within this methodological framework that I place the work of Rosenstock-Huessy. This method is summarized below in his discussion of the grammatical persons.

The third person forms the basis for objective statements. In the following, two usages are given and their social presuppositions revealed. "The objective statement 'it rains' or 'he loves,' not only abstracts from the speaker but from the listener as well! 'Objective' then, is a two-fold negation of relationship."¹³ The speaker and listener do not participate in the loving or raining itself but only debate the fact of either.¹⁴ This objective aspect of language is the most familiar to us in an age of science. But there is much more depth implied in the first and second persons than in the third.

The first person is an emotional and subjective usage. "A man who says amo is doing two things at once: He is involved in an act and besides he confesses it."¹⁵ The first person is used while the individual is living with the process which the words reveal to the listener which mean risk because it can be interfered with while in process.¹⁶ At this point in his discussion Rosenstock-

¹³ Ibid., p. 101.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 102.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 102-103.

Huessy uses the word "emphasis" to describe the dynamics of the first person. For him emphasis seems to mean that a speaker is appropriating the power of the spoken word. The power of speech is correlated to the resistance which the social setting places against it. "The emphasis with which a man is compelled to speak up, amo, must overcome the resistance of the social pressure which warns him not to invite interference!"¹⁷ The first person is a powerful tool. If taken seriously, the first person is the usage which initiates social relation. But as such it bears with it the risk of rejection or the imperative to reorder one's life according to the way the confession is appropriated by the social setting and the one to whom the words are spoken.¹⁸ If you say "I love you" the consequences are either a futile affection or the reordering of life to make a place for the love which is confessed. Thus, amo is misplaced with the Alexandrian grammar.

Amo is an emphatic form, a subjective exclamation which is quite wantonly inserted into the Alexandrian table as an indicative. The first form¹⁹ singular did not originate with the indicative.

The second person signals a complex relation. To speak of another requires permission. This permission is part of a complex interaction which Rosenstock-Huessy

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 103.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 104.

describes as a covenant. "The speaker's right to say 'amas' is derived from the covenant under which a certain amount of authority to speak was granted him!"²⁰ One characteristic of the covenant is preparedness.²¹ When the second person is spoken there should be an understanding between the speaker and listener that it is appropriate, that the listener intends to listen. This is the power of the second person sentence.²² The covenant of the second person usage is a relation with a power exchange which indicates that the speaker is taking authority which the listener is prepared to give.

From this discussion of the three persons
Rosenstock-Huessy reaches the following conclusion.

...whereas amat is debatable as to truth, amas is debatable as to authority, amo is debatable as to wisdom....amat stands disclosed as a dualism of our power to know, amas as the evaluation of a decision of our power of authority, amo as our power to reveal our secrets.

Hence,	knowledge	third person
	authority	second person
	communion	first person

are faced with different hurdles. Reason, knowledge faces problems of fact, of truth or falsity, of information or observation....But authority faces the dilemma between the listener's freedom and his necessity....And communion faces the decision between being silent and speaking out....

The social discrepancy between amat, knowledge of facts, amas, authority to tell, amo, revelation of secrets, is enormous. They represent three different

²⁰Ibid., p. 105.

²¹Ibid., p. 106.

²²Ibid.

social²³ processes between man, fellow man and the outer world.

Each of the persons stands within a social context from which it cannot be separated without taking its power away and making it a lie. So far we have examined three usages and their settings. In each case the setting was examined in relation to a speech situation, that is, in relation to a speaker and a listener. In the third person both are placed outside of the content of speech. In the second person the listener is the content. In the first person the speaker-confessor is the content. To round off the set of possible content relations a fourth aspect of the speech situation where both listener and speaker are the content is discussed. Since there is no fourth person that fourth element lies somewhere else in the grammatical table. Rosenstock-Huessy suggests the perfect active indicative is the place to look.

The Latin example of a perfect active indicative is amavimus, we have loved. "'We' in amavimus is a merger between speakers and listeners....All history is the tale of acts in which some speaker and some listener have become one."²⁴ "We" is the historical usage. But it is impossible for a modern mind to speak understandably of history without using the third person plural "they." We

²³Ibid., p. 107.

²⁴Ibid., p. 109.

tend to think of history as finished. The way in which words tie us to their previous usage and history contradicts this. Historical acts pass away but they (notice the "they") are non-existent for us unless they in some way assist in the concretization of the "We." What elements of the past we hold in common are our history. The consequences of taking the historical "we" seriously are: (1) we can appropriate our past for the nourishment of our life in the community instead of leaving it to the objectifying historians and thus losing it, (2) we can begin to understand the way in which the "we" we pronounce today will effect the way the generations after us pronounce their "we" in community life.

The significance of such a discussion of grammar is that it places basic human social relations into relief within the language which carries them and makes them real. It places these relations on a readjusted scale which takes its form from the modes of speech rather than the dominant form of understanding, the scientific. There is a place for objectivity but it is just one place among others. The multiformity of human life, meaning that we are not mere objective or subjective, future or past oriented creatures but all these at once, suggests that our lives can find fullest expression only if we are given several channels of speech. Of course, we have a freedom of speech. We are not oppressed by a power telling us

what to say. We oppress ourselves by not challenging dominant speech patterns. If we do take over our speech we often find those forces which have a vested interest in keeping speech the way it is when they claim that we are unreasonable or not understandable. A current example can be found in the separatist nature of language in the Black community. It is designed to be non-intelligible to the white man. The white man's language has been too narrow and oppressive. It has not been able to reflect the experience of the Black community.

The importance of realizing the potential of multi-form human relations which grammar concretizes is that in maintaining the multi-formity of grammar we can open new horizons from which to appropriate necessary forms of human life. But the appropriation is of a diversity and not a uniformity. When the third person and the first person are the same in emphasis we lose the intensity of communion and the exactness of real objectivity. The diversity of grammatical form must be maintained in order to maintain the diversity of human life. The difference and value of grammatical forms are due to different forms of human emphasis and the social realities which result. Here emphasis is not a rhetorical device but the indication of the "degree of immersion into what

is said."²⁵

This brief four-fold look at the multiformity of grammar is by no means complete but it does indicate that we lose human possibilities if we leave grammar unexamined and unused in its diversity. Now the problem of finding a conceptualization of human multiformity can be appreciated. The discussion of the grammatical persons took place at what Rosenstock-Huessy calls the second level of speech. It is the content of speech. The first level is that of the speech relation itself; the ability to speak, assumed possibility of understanding, the use of signs, and the possibility of failure.²⁶ He suggests four conclusions which can be drawn from this first level.

1. When we speak we are connected through the millenniums with the dawn of humanity because we try to use the proper words.

2. We are tending towards the completion of its evolution because we combine the heritage of the ages in an answerable, and that means in a new way.

3. We express the inner man's intentions and emotions, and thereby complete them and 'get them out of our system' as one says in slang.

4. We register the external processes which touch our senses, and we are not satisfied before our²⁷ sensations have been clarified in scientific language.

These four aspects of speech come together in a quadrilateral or "cross of reality."²⁸ They each represent one element of a two-fold space and a two-fold time. Within this four-fold speech relation or situation

²⁵Ibid., p. 112.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 51-52.

²⁶Ibid., p. 46.

²⁸Ibid., p. 52.

we begin to feel the strain of diversity. But it is this real strain, which, if not suppressed, gives health to speech.

Now and here, we are living in a twofold time and a twofold space. And we speak lest we get lost under the strain of this quadrilateral. We speak in an attempt to ease this strain. To speak means to unify, to integrate, to simplify life. Without this effort, we go to pieces by either too much inner, unuttered desire, or too many impressions made upon us by our environment, too many petrified formulas from the past, or²⁹ too much danger and emergency from the future.

We must face multiformity squarely before we can unify it. Unity has meaning only when it arises out of real multiformity which reflects the actual human situation. To say it another way, conflict which is an honest expression of diversity is healthy for a community. This can be said under the assumption that a functioning community cannot support itself if it dwells on only one element of human life. Christian community is based on a diversity of vocations and that the center of the diversity is the act of love for a brother. An act of speech is analogous to the centrality of an act of love. Speech assumes the relation of speaker and listener as the act of love assumes the relation of the one who loves to the loved.

Through Rosenstock-Huessy we, as churchmen, can come back to an understanding of the Church as a

²⁹Ibid., p. 54.

legitimate multiformity reflecting the human multiformity. Come back, that is, to a position where we can appreciate the necessity of fighting to maintain the multiformity of the institutional Church despite the problematic nature of such a task. It means that we have to admit that truth is as multiform as our speech. In the quadrilateral of human speech we are placed between four fronts, the inward and the outward of our social space, the backward and the forward of our social time. The value in using the notion of the quadrilateral and the temporal and spacial aspects of social realities is that we are faced with the problems of multiformity but not without the possibility of focusing them on each moment of our lives. The focus for the cross of reality is the speech act. Through the acts of love and vital speech the multiform nature of truth is expressed.

It is nonsense to believe that the scientist or the historian or the politician or the poet alone can know the truth. The truth is in the man who can speak all four languages with sincerity by using one and the same materials for all, and who does not disrupt the unity of speech by running away into a merely scientific, a merely poetical, a merely petrified or a merely revolutionary language. The truth is in the man who can ³⁰equate and identify the times and spaces of his life.

These four types of language each center in one aspect of the quadrilateral. Scientific language, the

³⁰Ibid., p. 56.

third person, deals with what is outside of us. Poetical language, the first person, deals with inner thoughts and feelings. Petrified language is that of the past, the perfect tense. Revolutionary language concerns the future, the second person imperative form. They all come together in the speech act.

We cannot utter a single sentence without using:

- | | |
|------------------------|----------------------|
| 1. a metaphor | =poetical language |
| 2. judgment | =scientific language |
| 3. historical material | =ceremonial language |
| 4. selection | =political language |

Everybody may celebrate the existing order, analyze the processes going on, express his heart's desires, and govern the course of events in the future. Many escape from this tremendous task. They either betray themselves or others, and they begin to talk just one speciality, or they³¹ become hypocrites by using other people's language.

It must be emphasized that the program of carrying out the maintenance of human multiformity is not a task for the individual but for a community. "There is no all around man....There is only humanity trying to do justice to all four fronts of life, and to recognize their inherent unity."³² Only if the Church remains a multiform community can it help maintain the intensity of human life. The Church is a place where people love and speak out of diversity but nevertheless minister to one another.

³¹Ibid., p. 62.

³²Ibid., p. 55.

CHAPTER III

SPEECH AND INTENTIONAL COMMUNITY

The work of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy allows us an understanding of the way speech maintains our time and space. Insofar as speech is always between two or more people it could be said that a social space and time is being maintained. It is by speech that commonality of time and space can be created. The following excerpts from Speech and Reality summarize the importance of speech.

Without common speech, men neither have one time nor mutual respect nor security among themselves. To speak has to do with time and space. Without speech, the phenomena of time and space cannot be interpreted. Only when we speak to others (or, for that matter, to ourselves), do we delineate an inner space or circle in which we speak, from the outer world about which we speak. It is by articulated speech that the true concept of space, and that is its being divided in an outer and an inner sphere, comes into being.... Wherever people articulate and vary one theme, they move in an inner room or community as against the world outside.

And the same is true about the phenomenon of time. Only because we speak, are we able to establish a present moment between past and future. Because I am telling you all this here and am waiting for your answer, is it possible for you and me to forget past and future, and to call this hour an hour, this paper a unity, this time one moment, one time span. By human speech, space and time are created.

¹Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, Speech and Reality (Norwich, Vermont: Argo Books, 1970), pp. 20-21.

Social time is more problematic than social space. People can come together but unless it is the right time and unless that right time can be celebrated and intensified the fact of physical proximity is a mere bodily stimulation or at worst, an exploitation. We must come together in time before our common occupation of a space has any meaning. This presupposes that we are not living in the same time. This may seem absurd to some and obvious to others. What it means is that none of us has the same past and future as that of our fellow beings. None of us feel the past and future in the same way. An old man remembers more than he anticipates. A young man anticipates more than he remembers. The content and the feeling for that content are different. We are different people in our times. Using Rosenstock-Huessy's word, we are "distemporaries."² The problem is that of becoming contemporaries in the radical sense of somehow intersecting our personal time as well as our space. We must be about the "synchronization of distemporaries."³ It is in the moment of speech that the synchronization takes place.

Such synchronizations are momentary and fleeting even though they are remembered and recapitulated by

²Ibid., p. 33.

³Ibid., p. 43.

individuals and communities. In speaking of such a momentary experience there must be included a discussion of that which provides a continuity for life before and after synchronized moments. The two elements of human life which seem to provide such continuity are morality and intentionality. Intentionality as studied in the work of Rollo May is related directly to the use of symbols by men. This is important for our study because through intentionality the proper symbolic expression, the proper speech, is explored as the ground of human willing. Intentionality becomes a word which describes how we live in time and use symbols. This is a problem which is basic to appropriate, well-timed speech.

But we do not have as direct a grasp on our intentionality as we do our morality. We consciously live out of our moral expectations for ourselves and others. While intentionality is the ground of our life in time and symbol, morality is the basis for the way we normatively order our usages. By usage is meant words, symbols, conceptions, and remembered events which are used in a repetitive manner from which we gain a continuity and order for our lives. Intentionality and morality are two levels of the same process, the maintenance of continuity in life through the media of symbols and usages. Morality, because it is held as normative, requires a commitment from us. This commitment is acted out through

speech and action which is normatively proper or improper. The norm as a constant requires a repetition in the forms which are proper. The repetition of proper usages in speech and action creates a continuity which can support life.

There is a tension, however, between intentionality and morality. New symbols can be formed within intentionality but novel symbols are slowly accepted by morality. Henri Bergson has explored the problem of novelty within morality. His discussion is also important because at several points he refers to usages and words as they relate to the problem of morality. The importance of usages is that they are the building blocks of morality. The repetitive aspect of usage can get in the way of the novelty of human relationships. Usages are both appropriate and inappropriate. Therefore, usage must be measured as to appropriateness and the measure is the same as that applied to grammar by Rosenstock-Huessy, namely, the way it relates to the basic language relationship as held between two people. Ortega y Gasset provides this critique following a discussion of Bergson's conception of morality.

Through this discussion of May, Bergson, and Ortega y Gasset we gain an understanding of how human space and time are maintained through intentionality and symbol, morality and usage. Social space and time is an

abstract conceptualization which facilitates the discussion of the relation of speech and community in that it separates two aspects of community life which are in constant interplay with real communities. Social space refers to the static configuration of a community which can be assumed as somewhat constant. It is a concept which points to the many forms of spacial proximity which characterize communities. Social time is a concept which refers to what persons remember and anticipate, what is seen as before and after in relation to the social space of the community. Social space and time come together in the present concrete life of a community.

The same problems which applied to the multiformity of speech apply to community. Both intentionality and morality support community life insofar as they support social time and space. Therefore, the problem of social time and space is identical with the problem of community life. Community life is intentional and moral, being based on the symbol and usage of speech and action. The phrase "intentional community" when rightly understood refers to a community where the repetition of usage and the novelty of a new symbol are welded together in moments of synchronous community time and space.

The phrase "intentional community" also reveals the impossibility of ever carrying out the formation of new community on a single level of human meaning. No one

idea is a sufficient basis for a community. No one function is a sufficient basis of community. The phrase "intentional community" reveals the diverse range of thinking and acting which must accompany all community building. The first word, "intentional," indicates the full range of psychological powers which give intentionality meaning as a word which points to the very core of our movement through time and space. The second, "community," points to our ability as humans to hold common elements between us. Intentional community can be defined as a group-of-persons' traverse through a common space and time. That a group could traverse the same time and space is impossible, yet this is what the words "intentional community" mean unless we are to submit to a truncated definition.

We cannot occupy the same space, we cannot exchange bodies, but we can occupy the same time. We all share social times and relative social spaces. The priority of social space over social time is that we can "synchronize distemporaries," we can come together. Within the above definition of intentional community based on social space and time the Church can be placed. If the Church is to have a community life which can support a sharing of space and a synchronization of times, then it must concern itself with its intentionality, morality, and speech. The following sections of this chapter are a

discussion of the problem of community within the two problems of intentionality and morality.

As the work of Rosenstock-Huessy is refracted through the problem of intentional community the spectrum of the problem can be stated. The complete thesis can be stated as follows. Speech, in which the speaker utters a language faithful to his space and time perspective, creates a new social time in which the listener can relate to the speaker's sense of before and after. This new social time can lead to a new, more intense, social space when out of a shared social time, moments of contemporaneous synchronized life arise. In such moments we experience the understanding and peace created by common times and spaces. We can feel at home in such times and spaces. Intentionality is the thread which provides continuity to life and, in this case, to the effort of speech.

INTENTION, INTENTIONAL, INTENTIONALITY

The three words in the title of this section are given in a progression which ties the more frequent understanding of intention to the more complex yet necessary meaning given in the word intentionality. Webster gives the meaning of intention as "a determination to act in a certain way." Determination is perhaps the word which most conveys the feeling induced by someone expressing an intention. "Intentional" is defined as a concretization of intention: "done by intention or design." There is a certain irony inherent in an objective discussion of intentional community given the import of "intentional." We discuss community under the sanction of "intentional" but we have no grasp of its meaning for life as long as we stand outside of a concretized intention which is being exercised within the second word of the phrase, "community." This is due to at least two major factors.

First, the depth of meaning which grounds "intention" and intentional" is such that it is not sufficient to exploit that depth by giving mere lip-service to it as a way of distinguishing one form of community from another. Intentionality of necessity pervades all forms of community. Intentional community is the only possible form of community. The difference

arises when intentions are made conscious and concrete. Here the word "design" given in the definition of intentional comes into play. Differences in community are found in their respective design and the level of consciousness of that design. A concern for intentional community is a concern for conscious intentions within community. The problem is not merely that of stating explicit intentions and then forming a community around them. It also must be the problem of recognizing the depth of intention necessary to make community possible. The task is as deep and complex as the full range of possible human intention. Since it would be almost impossible to ever come to such an understanding we must act while yet in the middle ground between pet personal intentions and a true understanding of the universe of intentionality. The problem is at best ambiguous.

The second factor making the problem hard to grasp is the climate surrounding the major element which we use to come to consciousness and to communicate our intentionality: articulate speech. Speech is in disfavor and disrepair in the United States at this time, 1973. The present trend is toward further disintegration. This will be discussed later. The problems of intentionality and speech within community are the topics of this paper. The purpose is to give definition to intentional community and its problematic nature in this period of

history. From this problematic nature and setting arises an imperative to realize intentional communities.

In working out the meaning of intentionality the studies of Rollo May are essential. I will let him introduce the discussion.

First, what does the term mean? We shall define it in two stages; the preliminary stage is the fact that our intentions are decisive with respect to how we perceive the world....But this is only one side of intentionality. The other side is that it also does come from the object. Intentionality is the bridge between these. It is the structure of meaning which makes it possible for us, subjects that we are, to see and understand the outside world, objective as it is. In intentionality, the dichotomy between subject and object is partially over come.⁴

Intentionality creates social space. The dichotomy of subject and object is that of subject and other subject within a common or community space. The unity that we strive for is constantly complicated by variation in individual perception. Intentionality influences this and we face the problem of a plurality of intentionalities which would make community utterly impossible if it were not for the second aspect of May's definition. That which overcomes the disunity of individual perception is the object which can come to each person as itself. But what of the other subject as object? This question asks whether community is possible when

⁴Rollo May, Love and Will (New York: Norton, 1969), pp. 224-225.

constituted by persons alone, with no common third element which all perceive as common. I think not. The necessity for a third element, when no other element is consciously given the role, appears in a person who becomes himself a symbol of community values.⁵ Such charismatic communities have mechanisms to separate the leader. Leaders and their heirarchy often live apart from the membership. Decisions are made in the same isolation.⁶ Such forms of separation indicate that a segment of the community has itself become a third element. The spacial distancing of residences is in itself a symbol of temporal distance. That is, the leader and heirarchy are making decisions for the future which the rank and file have no awareness of until it takes institutional form. In such instances the membership and leadership may have different intentions, given the separation of social space and time. This difference, whether conscious or unconscious in the membership, suggests that an organization has taken the place of the community; a heirarchy in place of a common social space and time. In sum, a variation of intentions indicates a variation in social time. We become "distemporaries" again.

⁵ Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Commitment and Community (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 116-117.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 119-120.

But the question arises: What is the actual relation of intentionality and social time. Rollo May is again of help.

All the way through this etymology is, of course, that little word "tend." It refers to movement toward something--tend toward, tendency. To me, it seems to be the core of our whole quest; its presence there in the center is a perpetual reminder that our meanings are never purely "intellectual" or our acts purely results of pushes from the past; but in both we are moving toward something. And mirabile dictu, the word also means, as we briefly saw, "to take care of"--we tend our sheep and cattle, and we tend to ourselves.... The conclusion, therefore, to which our argument points is that every meaning has within it a commitment.

Intentionality when directed by several persons toward the same meaningful object is: shared commitment. This is the positive formulation of the issue. When commitment is given to a meaningful ideal by a group of persons the task has just begun. Rosabeth Moss Kanter has formulated what is involved when commitment becomes a community issue.

For communes, the problem of commitment is crucial. Since the community represents an attempt to establish an ideal social order within the larger society, it must vie with the outside for the members' loyalties. It must ensure high member involvement despite external competition without sacrificing its distinctiveness or ideals.

Kanter's discussion of the problem reveals a

⁷May, pp. 229-230.

⁸Kanter, p. 65.

positive and negative side of commitment, both of which underline the fact that social time establishes social space. On the positive side, commitment ties people to a common future. Kanter suggests that "Commitment arises as a consideration at the intersection between the organizational requisites of groups and personal orientations and preferences of their members."⁹ The imperative she sees in this is the requirement of the system to meet "needs."¹⁰ This implies that people at present stand as partial and incomplete giving the future projected content of resources to make people whole. The ideals are projected as times and places of personal wholeness. Self-concept¹¹ and self-realization¹² are central notions. The pregnant future is all important. As such, it becomes the third common element which binds the community.

Such an overburdened future forces the realization of the negative aspect of commitment. What of the past? It can be assumed that past experience provides an impetus to enter community. It can also be assumed that individuals will have formulated what they want out of the future given their personal past. Yet, except for occasional problems which force a scrutiny of one or more

⁹Ibid., p. 66

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid., p. 67.

personal pasts, most communities have the feeling that time begins when their community begins. If a community does have a past that it wishes to maintain in contradistinction to the dominant society it too remains a parochial past, as do the individual pasts of other new community members. Kanter's discussion focuses on the problems of maintaining a social space, commitment being a function of internal feeling of the individual in relation to the social external demand.¹³ As long as individual notions of self concept and self realization provide common elements to be wrenched out of the future, the social space remains. But if the fit of internal and external is disturbed, the group disintegrates. The problem is that of adjusted futures which no amount of commitment can influence if that commitment has become anachronistic. Adjusted futures occur when the present moment is filled with a new realization of where we are in time. If a new look at an element of the past suggests that our future is a mere repetition, the future must be adjusted, and will be. On the other hand, the newly discovered element of the past may be desirable and again the future is adjusted to incorporate that element. When we are open to the past and to alternate futures we run

¹³Ibid., p. 66.

the risk of becoming distemporal with our community. The history of intentional community is littered with anachronisms which have not been open to a fresh look at the past and future. Our life in time makes intentional commitment as temporary as our openness to novelty. And without this openness we die. We die to the world: it changes and we do not. The deeper problem is the development of commitment within fluctuating social time. Or to put it another way, the task is to create a social time which can sustain community commitment.

As discussed above, it is intentionality that gives rise to meaning and commitment in the subject-object relation. When applied to community the basic triad of subject-object-subject arises. The common object as a third element provides for a commonality within intentionality. That common element can be an ideal such as self realization. The characteristics of such third elements needs to be discussed. That discussion will lead into an understanding of how a social space and social time can be established through the nature of the third elements.

The third element is symbol. There is an important priority which Rollo May describes.

An intention is a turning of one's attention toward something. In this sense, perception is directed by intentionality....But we must now hasten to say that this selecting process--I look here rather than there--is not at all simply a using of

neck and eye muscles to turn the head and line of vision in my picking out the object to which I attend. A more intricate and much more interesting process is occurring. It is the inner process of conceiving the object so that I can perceive it. Such is the amazingly intimate interrelation of my subjective experience with what goes on in the objective world: I cannot perceive something until I can conceive it. Professor Donald Snygg has reminded us of that memorable event when the people in a primitive society were unable to see Captain Cook's ship when it sailed into their harbor because they had no word, no symbol, for such a ship. What they did perceive I do not know--possibly a cloud or animal; but at least it was something they did have a symbol for. Language, or the symbolizing ¹⁴process, is our way of conceiving that we may perceive.

In between the subject and the object a symbol gives intentionality direction by communicating the object to the subject. Dr. May gives temporal priority to conception rather than perception. The relation of the subject to the other is established prior to our ability to express that relation. May calls this language or the symbolic process. Symbol is added to time as the medium of the relation of subject and object. It would seem then, that intentionality is the unification of symbol and self toward the attainment of relation to that which is symbolized. Language, as the bearer of symbol, is the medium in which relation takes place. This includes the non-verbal and bodily elements of language as well.

On the level of community, the unification of

¹⁴May, p. 236.

selves is accomplished through symbols. The well used ideal of self realization again serves as an example. A social space can be created around an idealized concept of a social space in which various notions of self realization can come to fruition. As suggested above, social time complicates unification around a social space concept due to adjusted pasts and futures of individual community members. It is my concern that any attempt to limit the adjustment of changing social time for individual and groups for the sake of preserving a social space and the ideal which makes possible that social space will damage the awareness of social time. The problem of constantly adjusting social times and that influence on social space seems to confirm that the creation of social time precedes that of social space.

Intentionality, in its role as the medium whereby symbols arise, must be the focus in searching for a symbol for a time as well as a space. The natives could not see Captain Cook's ship as ship nor could they feel Captain Cook's time as A.D., for instance. A.D. is a symbol for time. The Golden Age of...is another such symbol. But the more immediate problem of a symbol for our time remains. This has been called the space age, the electronic age, but these symbols are of little use. The priority of conception over perception in Rollo May's discussion leads to the suggestion that a symbol for a

social time needs to arise before we can perceive ourselves as within that time. Now we are on holy ground. Adam named the animals, but God named the times. The early church created a calendar which held it together where theology could not. Theology gave us our spiritual space, but the calendar gave us our spiritual time, and in its process or growth it was constantly adjusted, although that is less true today. The calendar made all Christians contemporary. They could speak to one another because they remembered and anticipated the same times. They named their times. Even today I can go into different churches and know what time it is, so to speak, and it makes a difference. There may be a diversity of thought on what needs to be done in order to adjust our social space, be it economic, political, cultural, or spiritual; but, churches can do it together because they keep the same time. Social space is exclusive, it means boundaries. Social time can mean unity within a pluralism where community is a function of time more than space, although social space will follow.

Intentionality creates symbols with which we can express meaning and commitment. Symbols can become the third element in the basic social triad. If a community is to reflect an exclusive concept and ideal that symbol can be brought out of social space. If a community wishes to be pluralistic, it must bring its unifying symbol out

of social time. Perhaps a good example of a unifying symbol of social time in the process of creation is the growing feeling that the Vietnam War had been going on too long. As yet no name has been given to this symbol-to-be and it will die as surely as Vietnamese civilians unless it is given a name. When a symbol arises it must be named or perish. Language is a symbol system, a body of symbols which bear the uniqueness of a name, a word. A symbol for a unifying social time must have a name. Naming is the symbolization of intentionality as it relates subject and object. Intentional community is a place where names have meaning and names can be created, both of social time and spaces. Language, then, is where we become aware of intentionality, of where we stand in space and time. Speech, as language appropriate to the moment, gives us our awareness of space and time. To echo Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, "By human speech, space and time are created."¹⁵

There is a complex convergence of factors in the relation of speech to intentional community which I do not want the examples used above to cloud. The importance of intentionality in community is that it is the source of speech and language. What arises out of intentionality is

¹⁵ Rosenstock-Huessy, p. 21.

a symbol which is a name for the meaning of a particular relationship of subject and world. That meaning requires commitment, otherwise, it is not a meaning at all. A symbol may name a type of social space or social time. Space requires boundaries for definition. Time requires pregnancy for definition. Boundaries are exclusive, pregnancy inclusive. Social time, our feeling for past and future, can change our perception of social space by adjusting our ideals and historical anchors. Social time precedes social space in this fashion. Social time is, then, a better foundation for intentional community. Contemporaries can understand one another, distemporaries cannot. Contemporaries share a moment in which speech can change the hearer. Distemporary talk changes no one. The above paragraph is a rather dry summary of the importance of intentionality and speech in community. It may also serve as a prime example of distemporary talk for the reader. But I deeply hope to the contrary.

Language and speech are important. We declare our times and places with it. Language is our link with intentionality when it is speech and not just talk. In a moment of speech we can share our most intense names and symbols. We can see where each other is tending. We can establish a common time and place. We can respond and be changed. If language deteriorates, the symbols we share no longer are able to communicate subject to object,

speaker to listener. Without appropriate moments of speech there is no possibility of community. We can no longer tend together. Meaning and commitment are lost. Intentions wither.

The importance of language is seen in the way Dr. May presents his chapter on intentionality. He starts out with an etymology. What is more strange for an American author? I have seen few authors as concerned for philology. In most schools each academic department has its technical vocabulary which allows it to define and refine in a manner which is almost incomprehensible to the outsider. Granted, this allows for deep incisions into problem areas, but this analytic use of language is in itself only a half true use of symbol. The analytic function of language depends upon the prior relation to that which is being analyzed, which relation language provides as its main function. An etymology is important in that it reveals the history of relation which a particular word has come through. The analytic use of language and the uncritical adoption of this function for symbols leads to a breakdown of those symbols in that they have been divorced from their primary function of relation of subject and object within intentionality. This in turn leads to the divorce of symbol from intentionality within life. We become blocked. We can no longer find words to express ourselves. We have no symbols at hand to give

meaning to whatever unity we have with the world. If we suggest that we can come to the problem of community with intention, yet make the attempt with language that is destitute of symbols of relation, we will meet perpetual frustration. The etymology provided by Rollo May helps us to overcome our destitution. We hold our language in common. That is where all community must start. It is now necessary to inquire into nature of the commonality given by language and its relative health in our present socio-political situation.

The following section draws heavily upon the work of Henri Bergson due to the fact that in his book The Two Sources of Morality and Religion he provides the conceptual tools for a discussion of the way in which the commonality of community symbols and language enter the social sphere as tools of social intercourse and structuring. He allows us to focus on the problem of repetition and novelty within normative social usages which is all important if an intentional adjustment of our speech usages is to be accomplished.

THE COMMON IN COMMUNITY

Bergson suggests that the basic commonality for a society is an orderly set of "habits of obedience" which correspond to social necessities and which come to us infused with a sense of obligation.¹⁶ The totality of these habits of obligation gives the weight of its whole to each particular obligation such that a breach of one is seen by most people as a breach of natural law owing to the inability to distinguish the difference between natural and social law.¹⁷ The wholistic, even monistic, sense of social order gives an ultimate cast to every slight act of deviation. To argue a case for a deviation on ethical grounds is doomed to failure before it starts because the specific deviation, no matter how ethical in the eyes of those who deviate, will be measured against the whole of the social order of obligation and not heard for the merits of the individual case. The people who went to Canada rather than participate in an immoral war in Vietnam will not be given amnesty in the near future because they have affronted the whole social order, even though they are probably correct in their sense of the

¹⁶ Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (Garden City: Doubleday, 1935), p. 10.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 10-12.

ethical dimensions of that war. The first thing that we can point to as common is our habit of obligation. At the extreme our duty is performed automatically, our obligation assumed with passive acquiescence.¹⁸ We have a common habit of valuing what is common. The norms that form the boundaries of our lives are ethical commonalities. Bergson goes on to ask a question which bears directly on our search for new community:

How comes it...that...obedience appears as a state of strain, and duty itself as something harsh and unbending? Obviously because there occur cases where obedience implies an overcoming of self. These cases are exceptions; but we notice them because they are accompanied by accute consciousness....

Here we come closer to an understanding of why we must speak. In some way we have given a part of our self to our task of obedience and we were thrust into that "accute consciousness" which arises when we awake from the sleep of monistic obligation. For Bergson, the person who comes to this consciousness has a new emotion.²⁰ What is distinctive about this emotion is that it causes us to search for a way to represent it. It is not the same as an emotion which has been caused by an already formed representation such as a piece of music. He describes this new emotion as follows. He juxtaposes the new

¹⁸Ibid., p. 19.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid., p. 43.

emotion to the old emotion based on obligation.

But the other kind of emotion is not produced by a representation which it follows and from which it remains distinct. Rather is it, in relation to the intellectual states which are to supervene, a cause and not an effect; it is pregnant with representations, not one of which is actually formed, but which it draws or might draw from its own substance by an organic development. The first is infra-intellectual, that is the one with which the psychologist is generally concerned, and it is this we have in mind when we contrast sensibility with intelligence, and when we make of the emotions a vague reflection of the representation. But of the other we should be inclined to say that it is supra-intellectual, if the word did not immediately and exclusively evoke the idea of superiority of value: it is just as much a question of priority in time, and of the relation between that which generates and that which is generated. Indeed, ²¹the second kind of emotion can be productive of ideas.

The new emotion is the basis of creativity but distinct from the emotion which surrounds our sense of obligation. The priority, both in terms of its inherent value and its temporal origin, of the new emotion seems to run a rough parallel to the priority of conception to perception in the symbolic process as described by Rollo May.²² In both cases the world seems to impinge upon the consciousness as a vague meaning which has an inherent value witnessed by the fact that we try to bring this vagueness into the clarity of representation, of language. There seems to be something here which is the common experience of Bergson

²¹Ibid., pp. 43-44.

²²See above, pp. 33-34.

and May.

The starting point for both men is the person in relation to people. The most obvious common element is that the person is the ground for any discussion of what is basic in life lived in relation. The usual starting point of sociology is the concept of role which is basically impersonal. The issue at stake is whether the commonality of community is best formulated at the personal or transpersonal level. Both have justification and application but the personal aspect is a more appropriate starting point for the discussion of intentional community in that our basic experience of feeling a need for a new approach to community is one of disjointedness or distance in relation to the dominant form of society. We may come to this experience out of social problems and their implied judgement on the dominant society, but the basic experience remains personal. It is this personal experience of a problematic society which Bergson and May help us to grasp.

The background of the common experience we are trying to focus on is "obligation, a tranquil state akin to inclination...."²³ Later Bergson describes the state in which mere obligation is carried out. "In a word, an

²³Bergson, p. 21.

absolutely categorical imperative is instinctive or somnambulistic, enacted as such in a normal state, represented as such if reflexion is aroused long enough to take form, not long enough to seek for reason."²⁴ Being faced with such a seemingly peaceful basis for our relation to that which society wants us to do it seems a shame to disturb the sleep walkers by asking whether the content of our obligation is worthy of such total acceptance. I can think of no more potent image of one at the mercy of his surroundings than a sleep walker. Bergson is speaking of a profound obedience yet his image also conveys a profound fragility. If the content of the obligation requires obedience which if continued would bring death, some questions need to be asked, some words need to be spoken.

It is especially important to review the content of obligation due to its basis in habit. As Bergson suggests, the intelligent formulations of reasons for an element of obligation can themselves become habit as they are used by the society. "But, then, is it not evident that, in a reasonable being, an imperative will tend to become categorical in proportion as the activity brought into play, although intelligent, will tend to become instinctive."²⁵ There seems to be a tendency in societies

²⁴Ibid., p. 26.

²⁵Ibid.

to justify a habit by pointing out that it has entered the realm of obligation, that is, it is seen in relation to all other obligations. It loses some of its individuality and its history which may mean that it loses its original reason for becoming a habit. In this way we inherit anachronistic habits as obligations which are very hard to root out and criticize individually. Ortega y Gasset provides a refinement to the line of argument which may allow an entry into the criticism of individual obligation or habit. Bergson identifies habit and obligation, intending a discussion of the moral perspective involved. Ortega y Gasset comes from a sociological perspective. He starts his discussion by relating the usual sociological identity of usages and customs which are habitual. The problem he points to is that habit is defined as "extremely frequent conduct, which, because of its frequency, has become automatic and stereotyped in individuals."²⁶ He rejects this definition, for we do many things frequently which are not usages (breathing) and other things infrequently that are (festivals).²⁷ The importance of this problem in definition is the logical priority which lies behind the equation of usage,

²⁶ Jose Ortega y Gasset, Man and People (New York: Norton, 1957), p. 193.

²⁷ Ibid.

custom, and obligation with habit. If the equation is maintained, the definitive characteristic of usage and obligation becomes frequency. Ortega y Gasset wants to reverse this by saying that the usages occur frequently because they are usages.²⁸ If frequency is no longer a definitive characteristic of usage, usage must be redefined on some other ground. He explored that ground in the earlier chapters of Man and People. In those chapters he suggested that our basic awareness of the social is the feeling of "we" where there is no acute awareness of the self-conscious "I." The next aspect of the social occurs when we face and confront a person as a "you" with some degree of openness characterizing the relation. In the full "you-you" experience we begin to perceive the "I." Using Rollo May's distinction, in the "you-you" experience we conceive the "I" using the symbol provided by the other "you" which can then be used in the self-conscious perception of our individuality. "I" is a result of the "you-you" encounter making the "you-you" experience prior to and the ground of the "I." This is his basis for saying that "the social appears not, as has hitherto been believed and as was far too obvious, when we oppose it to the individual, but when we contrast it to the inter-individual."²⁹ The polarity is not

²⁸Ibid., p. 195.

²⁹Ibid., p. 179.

"I"- "we" but "we"- "you-you." Between these two poles, between the stranger and the intimate, a usage is more or less appropriate, more or less demanded.

In his study of the salutation Ortega y Gasset outlines the history and etymology of salutation finding that the salutation was a sign, both verbal and physical, that the stranger posed no threat. In this case the usage, a particular salutation, was required or violence resulted. People require some sort of recognition when they meet or pass one another because without it the relation is under suspense or even suspicion. This requirement breaks down in mass society except when people come face to face for some reason. The more intimate two people are the less important a particular salutation becomes. The less intimate the relation, the more the person greeted is vague, a part of our reality which is less personal. "Now we see how the word 'people' signifies the abstract individual, that is, the individual emptied of his unique and unmistakable individuality, the anybody, the de-individualized individual--in short, 'a quasi-individual.'"³⁰ A usage, then, maintains the social order but becomes less useful in intimate relations. At times, it is offensive to such relations. The distinction between the social and inter-individual, the "we" and

³⁰Ibid., p. 203.

"you-you," helps in giving a basis for selection and evaluation of specific usages and obligations. Usages help maintain social order and are given their place in society by our obedience, they become binding observances.³¹ But they also become an irritation and hindrance when they find their way into the intimate experience. We can judge usages and obligations by their effective facilitation of social cohesion and the ease with which we can drop them at the appropriate time or are inappropriately bound to them.

We have yet another step in the analysis of obligation. The above refinement of the discussion would be enough if we had explicit and conscious control over usage, but as noted above, our obligation includes preconscious obedience as well. How can we get at the roots of a particular usage when all we have is the smallest of parts showing? We perform a usage yet the only starting point we have for an analysis of that usage is the mere performance and nothing else. Ortega y Gasset helps with this problem. His method is to do an etymology of the word which best symbolizes the usage. The result of this method is an understanding of how the usage grew through various stages of use. This allows for an understanding of how the usage comes to us and in what

³¹Ibid., p. 210

circumstances it has its frequency. This method of understanding the usage upholds the assertion that the usage causes frequency and not the opposite. It has an appropriateness before it has a frequency. The etymology reveals the history of appropriateness for a particular word and usage. He sums this up by saying that "Etymology" is the concrete name for what is usually and abstractly called 'historical reason.'³² The meaning of this summary is elaborated in a paragraph in Man and People which bears repeating.

Words do not have etymologies because they are words but because they are usages. But this obliges us to recognize and declare that man is constitutively, by his inexorable destiny, as a member of society--the etymological animal. Accordingly, history would be only a vast etymology, the grandiose system of etymologies. That is why history exists and why man needs it; it is the only discipline that can discover³³ the meaning of what man does and hence of what he is.

³²Ibid., p. 203

³³Ibid.

ETYMOLOGICAL THINKING

Bergson is aware of the etymological aspect of man and word but gives the relation a decidedly negative twist. He explores the concept of justice with historical reasoning and at one point pauses "to admire the magic property of speech, I mean the power which a word bestows on a newly created idea--when it extends to that idea after having been applied to a pre-existent object--of modifying that object and thus retroactively influencing the past."³⁴ The problem is that we judge and understand words and concepts of the past according to what they mean to us now. But further, when we use the same word to symbolize both the past and present phenomena the awareness of differences between the two is seen as the continuum of starting point and goal.³⁵ If the new concept must submit to the old word a false interpretation of both occurs. This is a picture of the etymological nature of usage in an unbridled state. Two problems arise in this notion. If a concept does in fact have its history and etymology, how can we say that that history had come to an end in the language we employ? We cannot. Second, if a concept is in flux an etymology is problematic. The problematic element is the life of the

³⁴Bergson, pp. 71-72.

³⁵Ibid., p. 72.

word or usage. Yet the importance of man is that he does have a life-giving language. What Bergson calls "retrospective anticipation"³⁶ is the life-giving quality of words in that they allow us to see our history as coming forward as a whole. The usage when used without awareness of its etymology leaves us open to misinterpret our history and live within a stream of time which we have no control over. It is our usages that give us our history, that "magic" nature of words to retroactively maintain our life and relation with others. We would have no communication if every word had to be created anew. Our usages sustain us but they also control us without our effort toward a conscious etymology. By etymology I do not mean merely the study and research of a formal etymology, but more. It appears that there is a whole range of etymological thinking that needs to be explored. The fruit of such thinking would be clarity as to position within history and ability to make appropriate criticisms of specific usages and obligations. Etymological thinking will take place against the background of blind observance and somnambulistic submission to obligation.

The stuff of responsible intentional community is the fostering of appropriate usages and obligations as a response to inappropriate demands. The range of response

³⁶Ibid., p. 73.

is as wide as the field of obligation. At this macroscopic level certain outlines of creative response to obligation appear. By now we have a feeling for the dimensions of obligation and usage with the resulting morality of compulsion. Usage occurs in a particular frequency and it is this repetition which is the very genius of usage. Its frequency allows people to become familiar with a usage--and use it. Bergson describes this repetition in the morality of compulsion as a pressure aiming at self-preservation which he further describes as a circular movement which keeps the individual in the same spot in the sense of maintaining him in a stable position as does an instinct for animals.³⁷ When a responsible alternative of this or that repetitive usage is born there is a brief moment in which the repetition is broken. To be sure, a new repetition will be born, but for an instant we are suspended in between two circular times. In this suspended time we give birth to a novelty, a new conception. Instead of employing usages to fill this moment we face the moment in all its possibility. It is a creative moment. Bergson places this moment between the static morality of habit and the dynamic morality of aspiration.³⁸ It is detachment and contemplation.³⁹ In

³⁷Ibid., p. 51.

³⁸Ibid., p. 64.

³⁹Ibid.

this moment the world comes to us stripped of usage. That world is novel and new compared to the world we assume on the basis of our usages. Usage gives us a familiar and secure world. The moment of detachment gives us the world as direct content for our thinking through new symbols. Etymological thinking begins in this moment. Only when we can go briefly beyond a usage can we gain the perspective needed to grasp an etymology, to gain the retrospective anticipation of which Bergson despairs. But the insight gained in this moment must be followed by a sustained pursuit of a critical understanding of the usage. In distinction to this Bergson suggests a morality of aspiration characterized by the feeling of forward movement.³⁹ The morality sustained by aspiration is open in that it can deal with general notions of morality such as justice. Such ideals check usages in the best of all possible worlds by giving the moral actor a sense of appropriateness and a commitment to new meaning in relation to the usage. The method of critical evaluation of usage, etymological thinking, takes place within the contemplation of ideals. This is an important distinction for those interested in intentional community formulation. It saves the community idealist from trafficking in vague

³⁹Ibid., p. 51.

utopias, in that usage and ideal meet. The result is etymological thinking in the broadest sense. We consciously reform the past, the usage which is an embodiment of the past, by taking it into the future, the critical modification of usage in relation to ideals. In other words, a critical use of language and symbols creates history. Such a creative history is linear transcendence of past usage. This linear history takes far less of our time than does the cyclical. It seems that very few people can sustain the creation of history. It is not unusual that Bergson draws upon sainthood and genius as examples. Again, the very presumption of our task of intentional community is the deepest self-idolatry --or is it that we are exploring unexplored fields of human potential? Only etymological thinking can make it the latter.

The discussion of the relation of past and future brings us back to our original problem in this definition --intention. We come from a past into the future. As a society we hold usages and obligations in common. As persons interested in coming to intentional community we need to critically evaluate and reform usages: we need to think etymologically. In this way we create the future. Because we have this intention, we are committed to a particular future of dialogue with specific ideals.

When, in etymological thinking, a usage meets an ideal the first result is a new social sense of time. An ideal makes sense only in relation to the history provided it by the usage. The basic response to this tension between usage and ideal is to introduce a method of problem solving. Such methods are an attempt to adjust social spaces so as to reduce friction. The curse and blessing of problem solving is that it is myopic. It is effective on specific problems, but it does not include a function whereby a critique of the sense of history and destiny of a people may be executed where it is in fact the cause of the problem in the social space. Stereotypes are usually historically rooted and project the future of all who fall under the stereotype. To attack a stereotype by adjusting a social space, such as isolating all those who fall into the type, does not solve the basic problem of a false history given by the usage or symbol of the stereotype. Neither does it allow for a new set of anticipations which may be felt by new ideals arising in the typed group. Social time, when imposed by an antagonist, is the most effective means of controlling a social space. If you're black and thought to be lazy by nature, you always have been and always will be, you will have your place defined by that trait. History creates human nature in this way. A usage dominates social space by dominating the history of our under-

standing and thereby dominates our anticipations.

Ideals do battle with usages when a society is healthy and able to adjust social time. Yet unless we can witness the battle and direct the movements we are still sleep walking soldiers. We need to proclaim the emergence of symbols which signal a new social time, a new epoch. Revolutions provide for such signalling. Small communities do so in peace. At this moment in the United States we are somewhere in between. Etymological thinking means finding out where we are.

SUMMARY AND THE UNITED STATES

In the American situation we face several characteristics of culture which make etymological thinking difficult. But before setting the American stage a succinct summary of the previous discussion is necessary.

Intentionality is the medium of human creativity. Within it a process of conceiving gives rise to symbols which are formed by a subject meeting an object. A symbol is what that object means to that subject. This union and its fruit is the process of conception. Symbols originate in union of subject and object. If the symbol no longer performs as a tool of perception, of relation, it dies. Dead symbols can be used, but they are so only where union is no longer required of them. Language and other symbolic mediums deteriorate in such a climate. When language is used with the integrity of anticipated union with objects or that which is addressed, the feeling is that of a "new emotion" in which we anticipate the ideal. In this language we tie ourselves to our history with etymological cords. The starting point and the end point become contemporaneous in this "retrospective anticipation." This can lead to error if left without critical examination. Such a critical examination takes place in etymological thinking. Etymological thinking

takes time seriously. Usages which root us in the past are confronted with ideals which tie us to the future. All usages which inhibit or prohibit the intimacy of open human relation must be brought to consciousness and examined against the past they represent and ideals which they are thwarting. It should be mentioned that ideals often become usages and need to be treated as such. The confrontation of past and future within etymological thinking gives rise to appropriate alternatives, avoiding the idolatry of the past and reactionary conservatism on the one hand, and the idolatry of the future and blind utopianism on the other. The best etymological thinking allows a person to approach the coincidence of right place and right time. It creates a new social time with an adjusted past and future. I suggest that Martin Luther King, Jr. was an etymological thinker. It now must be obvious that such thinking surpasses any description of it. Perhaps a more faithful symbolic phrase for this process might be intentional etymological thinking.

Applied to intentional community, this process gives the common element of that which is appropriate. All through this discussion the sense of alternative has been applied to the meaning of intentional community. When an appropriate alternative is given common consensus by persons who sense its appropriateness with a commitment to its meaning, an intentional community can be formed.

Because of the complexity of society and of human personality this alternative, though languaged in the singular, is as complex as the highest understanding of the members of the community will allow. The ability of a community to actually be an alternative, to be an appropriate response to the social setting in which it finds itself depends on the ability of its sharpest etymological thinking to gain acceptance and even consensus. Etymological thinking can arise only in persons who entertain a rich symbol system and the depth of relation to the other objects and persons in the world that that symbol system implies. But now we must justify ourselves. What is the need for intentional alternative community in the American setting?

Because no social system is static there is always a need for the dynamism of anticipation gain in etymological thinking. When adding the criterion of appropriateness, the right event as response to usage, the difference of etymological thought from other thought becomes that of appropriate creation over against repetition which can be appropriate or inappropriate in itself. Given this distinction, it can be said that that which inhibits appropriate etymological or creative thinking is both the subject for and justification of etymological thinking. Society needs etymological thinking to stay alive. A test of the climate for

etymological thought will reveal that which needs to be critically appraised. Because intentionality is the medium for symbolic activity in persons, a test of the health of intentionality within society can be obtained by ascertaining the health of the symbol system it uses. The first symbol system we use, and therefore the first which must be examined, is our language. The need to test the health of intentionality derives from the fact that intentionality is how we tend, how we enter time and create history. Etymological thinking is a conscious effort to understand the specific nature of this temporality within the peculiar symbol system of a society. How we order our social space, how we relate to the other, depends upon the health of our anticipation of the union of other and symbol within our intentionality. The integrity of our relation to others depends on the ability of our symbols to reveal what we feel and think inside symbols that will be understood by the other. A breakdown of intentionality is a breakdown of our symbolic integrity. In a word, social space depends on social time, social structure on intentionality.

So, we can appraise the health of our language as the first step in judging the climate for and subject of etymological thinking and personal relation characterized by symbolic integrity. Decaying usages will be reflected in decaying language. They can be discerned and responded

to. But there is a deeper problem which develops when the world around us changes with a rapidity which confounds language by loosening the relation of object and symbol by making all objects transitory. When the times of a society move faster than the plodding usages of language can relate to, a constant redefinition takes place; some of which may be valuable, being based on etymological thought, other of which may be capricious and less valuable. The integrity of language depends upon the fit of the symbol to object at the right time. An anachronism is humorous because it is the wrong symbol at the wrong time: the world no longer fits. Another word describing this integrity would be synchronism. When symbol and symbolized meet a meaning is created, a time of meaning. Such times of meaning are increasingly difficult when change in the social setting becomes rapid. In such rapidity fewer people are willing to make the effort to create times of meaning. Thus, the social setting becomes more and more meaningless, fewer times of meaning. Since this language decay points to problems of intentionality as suggested above, we face a grave problem as to our ability to survive as a society if our language fails us. Rollo May deals brilliantly with the deeper problems of a society in transition in his latest books. In the most recent, Power and Innocence, he deals directly with the problematic nature of language in this country.

The ominous title of the third chapter of Power and Innocence is "Language: The First Casualty." The first sentence of the chapter gives the explanation: "When an age is in the throes of profound transition, the first thing to disintegrate is the language."⁴⁰ Because "violence and communication are mutually exclusive,"⁴¹ the period of disintegration in language is accompanied by violence. Indeed, words themselves reflect the violence. "A word becomes aggressive as a stage in its deterioration, it loses its original meaning, takes on the aggressive form in obscenity, and then may pass into oblivion."⁴² In this context, words begin to lose credibility, but it is a fatal mistake to assume that because of that loss we can bypass the use of language. May gives two interesting examples of the attempt to bypass language. One is a news conference with Secretary of Defense Laird where no communication was allowed by the Secretary.⁴³ The second is action therapy where the body takes the place of language in the role of communication.⁴⁴ He concludes:

My body remains one way in which my self can express itself--in this sense I am my body--and surely it is to be appreciated. But I am my language as well. And I wish to point out the destructive trend represented

⁴⁰ Rollo May, Power and Innocence (New York: Norton, 1972), p. 65.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., p. 73

⁴³ Ibid., p. 71.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 69.

in action therapies precisely in their implicit attempt to bypass language.⁴⁵

Technological society aids in the destruction of language by demanding that accuracy in language demands narrow definitions.⁴⁶ The narrowing of language by technological definition is a middle point, along with obscenity, in the deterioration of language. Limitation of meaning is apparent in both. With obscenity it is the slap in the face which is communicated but we are no closer to meaningful relation. With technological language an object is described but it is next to meaningless for us. In both cases, the words, the symbols, no longer tie subject to object with a resultant meaning which is a spur to our intentionality. Instead we have aggression and manipulation. They remain forms of communication but at a severe loss of meaning. They no longer allow us to anticipate union of subject and object. Because the use of language is difficult and painstaking in a transitional period fewer people are interested in taking the time to communicate. The unwillingness to take time to communicate verbally not only short circuits the development of symbolic meaning but intimacy of relation as well. A period of time is required for intimacy to develop.⁴⁷ By

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 70

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 75.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 70.

trying to get around language, we get around intimacy. Because thinking itself takes time, the same can be said for it as was said for intimacy. By allowing transition to spook us, we lose symbolic meaning, intimacy, and reflective thought. We can only suffer from such loss: we can only deteriorate.

We have deteriorated. I need only point to the explicit reduction of communicative language in the 1972 presidential campaign. Political analysts saw the closure of communication by Nixon as an expedient political maneuver. How many times I have heard, "Well, he had nothing to lose." What is utterly terrifying is that this technique won Nixon a landslide victory: Americans don't want to be spoken to! What kind of experience is so fragile that it cannot bear the weight of speech? Will all of our values crumble if we speak about them? If they are so, we are in more trouble than we could ever imagine. No search for stimulating experience can help us if our national values and policies cannot bear open speech. Language not only makes meaning possible, but it ties us to the past and future as well. The retrospective anticipation and the anticipation of union through symbol which are the frontier of our intentionality are also the frontiers of our history. The immediate experience of action therapy at a nudist colony and the immediate experience of accepting Nixon without speech are both

indications that we no longer desire to communicate with the intensity of past and future as they impinge on our language. The triumph of immediate experience over history is the triumph of social space over social time.

The error is in using experience as a way to shut out thinking or in using "immediate" experience to evade the implications of history. The younger generation is right in its attack on "mere" thought, "mere" words, and so on; but it makes the same error when, under the guise of "experiencing life," it seizes on "mere" feelings, "mere" actions, or any other partial function of man. The "experience" then becomes intellectual⁴⁸ laziness, an excuse for sloppiness of execution.

Language is endangered by our whole society, young and old. Only life lived within historical thought and action will give life to society. Again, social time creates social space. This is etymological thinking. When the appropriate thought meets the appropriate course of action, intentional etymological thinking takes place. This can only happen where symbolic interaction, both of language and gesture takes place. In our society at this point in time such interaction is discouraged. This is why we need intentional community within the Church. We need a place where men can speak from the depths to one another. We need time, love, and language.

⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 76-77.

CHAPTER IV

COMMUNITY LIFE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT AND THE PRESENT

Appropriate speech can create community. Such speech rests upon a critical examination of usages and the social time of a community, its past memory and its future ideals. Social time has been discussed in an abstract way thus far. It remains to speak concretely of this concept so that it can be appropriated as a viable concept which can be applied to concrete contemporary human problems. Any discussion of social time presupposes the diversity of real persons' sense of time and the possibility for the synchronization of distemporaries. Diversity of social times which individuals and persons hold is the ever-present background upon which an ever-possible synchronization of distemporaries may take place. Through speech we can recognize the dimensions of diversity and create the momentary synchronization of time. The concrete problem of diversity and unity rests upon the nature of the relation between speech and time. It is then diversity and unity within specific senses of social time at which we must look to see how social time can be understood in concrete terms.

Any examination of social times demands that we

become aware of how we feel and think about our past and future. This means wondering how past and future form the temporal borders of our immediate social space of community. This problem will be examined in two aspects: (1) the early Christian community, and (2) the contemporary dimensions of social time. The first discussion will center around Paul's conception of life in the New Testament community as presented by Ernst Käsemann. The most important insight to be gained is that the New Testament community's sense of time and history forced a distinctive concept of community life to come to light. It is the question of a contemporary time sense which is explored in a second section in order to determine what time sense a contemporary community may have as a basis for community life. The work of Erik Erikson and Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy will be used in the second section. The witness of the New Testament community and its distinct self-consciousness is that time is important, we must know where we are. The second section is an attempt to find out where we are in time as contemporary men. Our sunchronized moments will be created by the interaction of specific social times. The character of social time is, therefore, crucial to an understanding of the possibility of synchronous moments. It is assumed that if we become conscious of our place in time we can more rapidly bring our community life together in time and

space. We can then articulate our times and places with appropriate speech. And when times and places are consciously articulated we can share them with our brothers in community.

For the Christian, the self-consciousness of the primitive community as expressed in the New Testament is the starting point for any discussion of the life within the faith. In respect to the question of the early community's consciousness of itself as a distinct form of social life, the New Testament is vague. The closest Greek form to our word Church is a word not used in the New Testament. It comes later in the Church's self-understanding. The word is kuriakon, a Greek form meaning "'(thing) belonging to the Lord,' which was applied originally to a Church building."¹

Another Greek word used to describe the community is ecclesia in its Latin form, ekklēsia in the Greek, referring to both the whole Christian community and its individual communities as well.² Beyond this, the New Testament community founded itself as an organic society on the basis that it was the inheritor of promises made by God to Israel.³ This conclusion is drawn from Jesus'

¹F.L.Cross (ed.) The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 283.

²Ibid., pp. 283-284.

³Ibid., p. 284

teaching concerning the Kingdom.⁴ The Greek term for Kingdom, basileia, contains two basic conceptions:

(1) An eschatological reign of God, inaugurated by the judgment of the nations and the end of the world in its present form, or already mysteriously present as the new aeon. According to apocalyptic literature the salvation this basileia brings will not be confined to the Jews. (2) An earthly kingdom of God to be established on earth by the triumph of the Messiah. The basileia of God is the substance of Christ's preaching; in him and his deeds (subjugating the devils) the basileia is at hand...and with it the salvation of mankind.⁵

The metaphor to describe the relation of the future Kingdom to our present is that of a mustard seed in the process of growing.⁶ This metaphor seems to be the orthodox conception of the relation of the present to the future concretization of the basileia.

John Macquarrie in his Principles of Christian Theology refines the metaphor of growth in terms of potentialities for the Church.

While the Church is not to be identified with the eschatological notion of the kingdom, the kind of relation that subsists between them means that the Church has its eschatological aspect too. We may think of the kingdom as the entelechy of the Church, the perfect unfolding of the potentialities that are

⁴Ibid.

⁵Karl Rahner and Herbert Vorgrimler, Theological Dictionary, Ed. Cornelius Ernst, Trans. Richard Strachan (New York: Herder and Herder, 1965), p. 49.

⁶Ibid.

already manifesting themselves in the Church.⁷

But entelechy of the kingdom is not exclusive.

The kingdom is the entelechy of the world as well as of the Church, so its realization would mean the disappearance of the Church as a distinctive entity.⁸

The fundamental problem for the community of the Church is the formation of its social institutions around its growth into the kingdom, its awareness of the entelechy of the whole world. How can the Church constitute itself as a community in light of the eschatological time in which it finds itself? And in this sense, what is the intention of the Church as a community of believers in "Thy Kingdom come?"

Ernst Käsemann has written a very important essay as a contribution to the question of how the New Testament community constituted itself. In "Ministry and Community in the New Testament"⁹ he proposes that there is a concept which underlies the Pauline understanding of how the community constitutes itself which defines "the essence and scope of every ecclesiastical ministry and function--namely, the concept of charisma."¹⁰ Käsemann

⁷ John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966), p. 349.

⁸ Ibid., p. 350.

⁹ Ernst Käsemann, Essays On New Testament Themes (London: SCM Press, 1964), p. 63.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 64.

discusses the problem of ministry and community from the starting point of the problem of the nature of ecclesiastical office in the New Testament. This is of great help in our concern for the way in which the early Church constituted itself as a community in that the configuration of persons and their respective talents and skills which form the community is exactly the problem he discusses. The concept of charisma covers the whole community in a way that the notion of office cannot. Indeed, the New Testament has no technical definition of such offices.¹¹ In the following we shall trace Käsemann's essay carefully because it sets before us a clear example of the particular integration of a new social time and space within the Pauline concept of charisma and its reality in some early communities.

The primary Pauline phrase with which Käsemann starts is Romans 6:23, "The charisma of God is eternal life in Jesus Christ our Lord." All other forms of charisma stem from this primary gift of eternal life "and they only exist where the gift of eternal life is manifested in the eschatologically inaugurated dominion of Christ."¹² But what is the gift as it composes a part of our day to day life?

¹¹Ibid., p. 63.

¹²Ibid., p. 64.

For Paul, to have a charisma means to participate for that very reason in life, in grace, in the Spirit, because a charisma is the specific part which the individual has in the lordship and glory of Christ; and this specific part which the individual has in the Lord shows itself in a specific service and a specific vocation.¹³

In sum, the gift of the eschatological End is eternal life.¹⁴ But the meaning of that end time becomes a real time sense for the community, its social time. Under the one gift of a new time, a new End, the form of the community, its social space, changes. A person's vocation is somehow related to the community structure and to the community's time sense. It is the explication of their interrelation that Paul attempts through the use of the concept of charisma.

One characteristic of the new social space that is created is that of edification. Mere possession by a spirit is not enough to qualify a person as one with a charisma. The criterion is "the Word which tells how God has loved the world and how he justifies the ungodly."¹⁵ Added to this criterion is the test of the possession: it must render a service to the community, it must be useful.¹⁶ Paul is saying that spirituality is not enough. I Corinthians 14 is the source for this discussion. Given this criterion and test Käsemann summarizes Paul's meaning.

¹³ Ibid., p. 65.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 66.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 68.

Its critical power lies in the Gospel itself which shatters the autonomy and the self-justification of the pious, even the spiritually gifted. Heaven comes to earth when grace creates obedience and the acceptance of responsibility towards God and is understood as purely the foundation of service.¹⁷

The social time of the eschatological community means nothing for Paul unless it is manifest in acts of service, the creation of a social space.

Another criterion of true charisma, a true gift of God which is inseparable from the power of the giver, is the solidarity of the community.¹⁸ Käsemann emphasizes that this notion of community is corporeal and not spiritual.

Pneuma (spirit) is for Paul the very antithesis of spirituality and inwardness--it is the power of the Resurrection because it is the power of the Risen One. Therefore the truly spiritual service of God consists self-evidently, according to Rom. 12.1ff., in the offering of our bodies; and the baptismal instruction of Rom. 6.12ff. teaches that this bodily obedience is the sign that our existence as Christians springs from the resurrection of Christ and moves towards our own resurrection.¹⁹

Paul's concept for the community that offers its bodies is the body of Christ. But the intensity of this concept must not be interpreted away.

The concept 'Body of Christ' may not therefore be interpreted as an edifying metaphor or as a daring idea. It is for the Apostle in its very corporeality the reality of the community inasmuch as the community itself, as the place of the Risen Lord's dominion, represents the new world.²⁰

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 68.

²⁰Ibid.

The criterion of solidarity allows us to further describe the interplay of social space and time. The community faces toward the eschatological Kingdom which has been revealed concretely in the Resurrection. Our response to this new time is obedience to the gift of God to each of us, our charisma, our specific vocation, which is to be expressed to its fullest within the community. When this obedience occurs within the community the product is a new solidarity. The name for this new social space is "the body of Christ." This particular social space would be absurd without the social time which founds it. Without an eye to the Resurrection and our resurrection the expression of a personal spirituality would only be a fractioning of the community, a mere contest of personal power. But "the body of Christ is the real concretion before the Parousia (second coming) of the universal sovereignty of Christ."²¹ It is Christ's power that is manifest in the community, not our own. Because of this it can be tested against the love and justice for the unloved that the expression of a true charisma produces.

Another criterion is that of multiplicity. Käsemann points to I Corinthians 12:14 as a key passage for the understanding of this aspect of Paul's conception

²¹Ibid.

of community.

'The body consists not of one member, but of many.' Conversely, this multiplicity (of individual charisma) does not cause the body to disintegrate but makes its true unity possible. For while like entities can only cancel each other out and render each other superfluous, unlike entities can perform mutual service and in this service of agape can become one. In so far as the Church understands itself as the dynamic unity of charismata and of those endowed with them, she cannot²² find her order in uniformity and rationalization.

The solidarity of the community is dependent upon its multiplicity, its multiformity. It is a very basic unity, the multiformity being the basis of a mutuality of service. The world of uniformity, of merely Jew or merely Greek, becomes the new community of both.

The nature of the solidarity of the Christian community can be placed in relief against the two more common foundations of social interaction, economics and culture. The solidarity of a community based on the interrelation of individual roles is a concept of society which belongs to an economic understanding of human society. Diversity becomes functional in the market place. Such multiplicity is seldom encountered in native community culture which is usually defined on an explicit and exclusive basis. For Paul, Jew over against Greek provided a background of such exclusivism in a religious and cultural sense but Jew and Greek alike found them-

²²Ibid., p. 70.

selves trading in the market place. In the market place the basis of unity is the common necessity of life and the mediation of valued objects such as gold. For the individual Jew or Greek a cultural unity is provided by an historical background, the mediation between persons is effected by an identity with this historical background. The dual mediational elements of valued objects and personal identity each have their sphere of influence; the former in the market, the latter in the native community. These are the relationships within which the Church always finds itself. In the market a multiplicity is unified through the common valuation of an object. In the native community a cultural identity is the basis of unity. How can the Church bring about a unity of persons which is not based upon the exchange of valued objects or of a cultural identity? This is the complex background upon which Paul's conception of community shows its true radicality. Again we turn to Käsemann for a summary answer to this problem.

The unity of the body of Christ which, according to I Cor. 12.13, Gal. 3.28, Col. 3.11, comes into existence through baptism, the identity with himself of the Christ who reigns in and over all his members, this unity and identity is only potential and actual in the multiplicity of the charismata; it cannot be objectified or manipulated, it exists only in actu--in the act of agape, of service.²³

²³Ibid.

In the market the common coin is a symbol of the power inherent in one person or one economic unit. Wealth can create a social space which is desired by its possessor. The economically powerful can direct the creation of social space. In this sense the common coin is a symbol for the power of a created or potentially available social space. In a similar manner the cultural identity of a people is a symbol for a particular social time. The identity of a member of a tribe or nation is encapsulated and recapitulated in the cultural and historical understandings of that member. The section from Käsemann quoted above indicates that both the economic and cultural symbols are transcended by the Christian understanding of community. The cultural identity is transcended by an identity with Christ. A new social time is appropriated within this identity through baptism. The Christ with whom the Christian identifies is the Christ who will rule in the anticipated, the eschatological future. Yet the Christian can appropriate that identity now because the incarnation of Jesus the Christ was real, a real inauguration of a new time. Christians celebrate this new time by saying "Thy Kingdom come." Likewise the coin of the market place is transcended by a new interaction. The act of love, of service, to the other in the community becomes the new basis for a relation between diverse human forms and

styles. Just as there is no market without the exchange of coins, so there is no Christian community without the exchange of acts of love. The Christian is called to appropriate a new social time and space which transcends all other identities and coinages. He is literally remade in this new time and space.

The Church is, then, the community of those persons who live within the real anticipation of the Kingdom. Because of this real anticipation they submit to the Lordship of Christ in the present moment and in the contemporary movement of history which is a progression, however mysterious in its outline, toward the realization of the Kingdom, the explicit realization of Christ's Lordship over the whole universe. This new time demands the realization of a new community. The new time is meaningless unless it has the power to inspire a new space. But it is not merely a new living space created within a vacuum. Because we have other times and spaces that we live out of we, as Christians, are constantly placed in situations where we have to transform the previous times and places into the act of service based on our life tending toward the End. The transformation of an existing set of circumstances through the act of loving is the nature of our obedience.²⁴ All baptized persons have

²⁴Ibid., p. 72.

a charisma which can be succinctly defined as "the concretization and individuation of grace or of the spirit."²⁵ God's grace is particularized within the community and thereby enters the world through the obedient service of that community, the body of those who are in the Lord.

Käsemann points to three Pauline watchwords which help set parameters to the forms of obedience which arise out of the gift of a charisma, the Christian's new vocation within a new time. He paraphrases the first as "To each his own" meaning that all charismatic gifts are different and not equal in nature.²⁶ This indicates that the grace of charisma is circumscribed. "Grace liberates me for new obedience within the specific range of possibilities which has been opened to me."²⁷ The second watchword is "for one another" meaning:

It is only in the objective exercise of ministering love, of which not only wide knowledge but also discrimination and tact are essential components, that the charismatic gifts can be safeguarded against abuse.²⁸

The third watchword is "Submit yourselves to each other in the fear of Christ" which points to the concrete reality of Christ that we face in the fellow Christian, the brother charismatic.

²⁵Ibid., p. 73.

²⁷Ibid., p. 77.

²⁶Ibid., p. 76.

²⁸Ibid.

This means concretely that authority and charisma go together in the community and, as charisma is only manifested as genuine in the act of ministry, so only he who ministers can have authority and that only in the exercise of his ministry.²⁹

Given these three watchwords, obedience can be described as an act of love which is bounded by the personal potential of the Christian and directed toward another person who is the presence of Christ and as such, confronts the Christian as a brother. The relation can be characterized with connotations of authority only in the act of loving and not as inherent in the individuals themselves.

Within this obedience, the Christian recognizes no specific authority over-against his act of love. There are no specific times and places which can be predefined as sanctified.³⁰ God has claimed all times and places for the act of love. Christ is the ruler of all times and places because his community is obedient in its ministering of love to the whole world within which it finds itself. God claims all social space and time as his own through the Incarnation, the once and for all gift, and through the specific gifts of charisma.

Within charisma and its obedience the creation of community can be understood as an act of obedience.

²⁹Ibid., p. 78.

³⁰Ibid., p. 79.

Indeed, Käsemann sees this as the primary act of obedience. Speaking of the Christians he says: "As a spiritual priesthood they offer the sacrifice which is well-pleasing to God--the building up of the community."³¹ In obedience to a new time a new space must be created. The Church is that new space.

The Pauline concept of community and its problem of the relationship of its members through charisma has helped to introduce the problem of social time and space in the Church. The problem was specific for the early Church of Paul's time. The question of the proper form of the Church community is at stake. In Paul's conceptualization of the problem he realizes as did the whole of the early community that a new time has been inaugurated by Christ.

In the twentieth century we are much less aware of the Church's new time, it has become old. We have inherited the social space which we call the Church, it has become old as well. Where is the new time for us that demands a new space be forged with the tools of our obedience? Unless we can answer this question we will perpetuate a Church which is a mere anachronism. God still claims our times and places for himself.

But if God's claim on our time and space is to

³¹Ibid., p. 80.

have any meaning at all we must know where we are in time and space. Since an awareness of our living space is more available to us than an awareness of our living time the following section is an attempt to isolate some major elements which come together in our contemporary social time. The predominant theme in our social time is the human life-cycle. It has both a personal and a social dimension. Erik Erikson's work is valuable for its emphasis on the personal aspect of the stages in life. Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy's work helps us to gain an understanding of the stages in community life within contemporary history.

I will work with two primary sources: Erik Erikson, Insight and Responsibility, especially the essay entitled "Psychological Reality and Historical Actuality;" and Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, Out of Revolution, especially the epilogue entitled "The Metanomics of Society." In the background of this discussion the subject-object dichotomy has been laying in wait, eagerly awaiting the chance to devour all notions entertaining the possibility of real relation. And, after all, the question of intentional community demands that real relation be not merely possible, but consciously possible. The intent of this discussion is to explore the social implications of this dichotomy.

Rosenstock-Huessy works from the premise that formulas which symbolize the thinking and acting of an age are relative to the social institutions which arise as a response to elements in human life which need emphasis because they have been neglected by a previous age. In reference to the subject-object, mind-body distinction he summarizes the historical progression as follows. "If Scholasticism had not done away with all the local myths about the universe, Descartes could not have asked reasonable questions about it."³² The interlocking of phases in progressive human thought gives the scholarly imperative to us. Any discussion of our present historical position must include an accurate understanding of that which preceded. Scholasticism bore an organic relation to Descartes, "I think, therefore I am." What relation does the subject-object dichotomy forwarded by Descartes bear to us? Rosenstock-Huessy answers with a new formula:

Thus our formula has been given in three simple words: Respondeo etsi mutabor, I answer though I have to change. That is, I will make answer to the question because Thou madest me responsible for life's reproduction on earth. Respondeo etsi mutabor: By self-forgetting response, mankind stays "mutative" in all its answerable members.³³

³² Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, Out of Revolution (Norwich, Vermont: Argo Books, 1969), p. 752.

³³ Ibid., p. 751.

This formulation of the motto for a new age grows out of the previous motto, "I think, therefore I am," as a response to the social implications of that previous.

The notions of object and subject, idea and matter, do not aim at the heart of our human existence. They describe the tragic possibilities of human arrogance or pettiness, the potentialities of despot and slave, genius or proletarian. They miss the target at which they shoot: human nature. Though man tends to become an Ego and is pressed by his environment to behave like an It, he never is what these tendencies try to make him. A man so pressed into behaviorism by awkward circumstances that he reacts like matter, is dead.³⁴

The notion of human ego is under constant revision for this reason. It cannot hold life. The conception of ego as somehow static and unchanging, a strict identity, has fallen. The potential for human variability in the face of his need to respond in meaningful ways to new elements in his personal and social life has changed what we call our "ego" into a mutable term. Once mutability is taken seriously the question of time and history enter for serious consideration. As with social history, what precedes in our personal history influences where we are now and where we will go. This means that if the ego is to become historical, it endures time with the same perils of loss and growth as does all other life.

Erik Erikson has dealt critically with the

³⁴Ibid., p. 745.

relation of self and history. The question is again that of the relation of our inner self to the outer world.

Maybe our habitual reference to man's environment as an "outer world" attests, more than any other single item, to the fact that the world of that intuitive and active participation which constitutes most of our waking life is still foreign territory to our theory. This term, more than any other, represents the Cartesian strait jacket we have imposed on our model of man....³⁵

He proposes to resolve the question by drawing a distinction between reality and actuality. He defines reality as,

...the world of phenomenal experience, perceived with a minimum of distortion and with a maximum of customary validation agreed upon in a given state of technology and culture; while actuality is the world of participation, shared with other participants with a minimum of defensive maneuvering and a maximum of mutual activation.³⁶

Ego actuality is characterized by mutual activation for Erikson. The problem of outer and inner focuses in the activation of one another. "One can speak of actualities as co-determined by an individual's stage of development, by his personal circumstances, and by historical and political processes...."³⁷

The introduction of a critical concern for the reflexive nature of selfhood in Erikson is preceded and paralleled by a concern for the reflexive social self in

³⁵ Erik Erikson, Insight and Responsibility (New York: Norton, 1964), p. 163.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 165.

³⁷ Ibid.

the work of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy. In fact, they use the same word as a general description of what takes place: inspiration. The reflexive, responding self is changed by the act of responding. It is this change-due-to-response that creates history and alters the past and future. It is a strange truth that the creation of history depends upon the adjustment of our relation to past and future rather than an acquiescence to a stationary past and ideal future.

Speaking of the stages of the life cycle, Erikson states the issue as follows. "For it is clear that each stage of development has its own acuteness and immediacy, because a stage is a new configuration of past and future...."³⁸ The healthy progression through the life cycle depends upon "a new configuration of past and future" which re-forms the self. Reformation, as it effects the self, is the recognition of a new history. History is never merely established fact. It is our perception of that which activates us that allows us to create history in a specific way. Without a constantly mutating sense of history we cannot endure or create history. To be fixated with a particular conception of history, of that which activates, means to live in the

³⁸Ibid., p. 166.

past. The creation of history, then depends upon a time sense which is open to new pasts as well as new futures. Utopias are mistaken images of an ideal past projected into the future because they admit no new pasts as a method of justifying one ideal future. Or, on the other hand, if the past can be controlled, so can the future. It is not merely a dictatorial prank that Soviet Russia and the United States have a myth of their origins which cannot be tampered with. The future depends upon the stability of their particular refraction of history. Any new configuration of past and future may demand an adjustment of personal relations to others and to one's social space that would shake the very foundations of these nations. We are free to change our personal sense of history as long as it does not affect another. But this demand is regressive in that it thwarts mutual activation of selves. A new history, a new sense of where we are in time is the basis of all radical change, both personal and social. Social time created social space.

Social time consists of: (1) a personal sense of history at a particular stage in the life cycle, (2) the timing inherent in the life cycle which is articulated by the conceptualization of a stage as having a right time in the whole of the life cycle, (3) a corporate sense of where a society is in relation to all of history,

and (4) a sense of timing, of what is appropriate given the corporate position in history. Personal historical sensitivity is part of the social time of a people because it arises in the mutual activation of persons. The line between personal and social biography is indeed tenuous. For this reason questions concerning social ethics in contemporary history are asked both by Erikson and Rosenstock-Huessy, the psychologist and the sociologist. True alternatives for community and the education to give such communities a temporal self consciousness must come from an ability to deal critically with all established senses and patterns of history and their respective demands for how we enter time, our timing.

At this point there is a second similarity between the work of Erikson and Rosenstock-Huessy. It comes in their basic patterns of approaching historical progression. Progression for the individual is through a distinct life cycle which Erikson has pioneered conceptually. Progression for societies is also through life stages for Rosenstock-Huessy. While Erikson's development of the stages in the life cycle apply to the psycho-dynamics of human development, Rosenstock-Huessy focuses on the stages in life of both sexes as they are instantiated in the development of societies and nations.

The life-cycle of man leads him through different physical stages. Child, adolescent, youth, man and old man; each is different from all the others. Girl,

bride, mother, housewife, and grandmother are even more sharply divided. The human race has exploited the potentialities of the life-cycle. It has based its different forms of organization³⁹ on the properties of different ages in the two sexes.

It is not within the scope of this paper to draw out the details of these parallel discussions. Rather, the point intended is that we can orient ourselves in time by a critical look at the life cycle of person and society. We can establish our position by knowing where we are, what stage we are in, and what needs to be done to complete the stage and progress to the next. The need to progress is far more apparent in the psychological cycle than in the social. Nations have a tendency to freeze history and become timeless for to admit that there are stages in history is to admit that one day our society will die, as it must. To not admit this is to die even sooner. If we are aware of our social progression we have the advantage of anticipation and preparation for the future. More correctly, the question of when and where to form an alternative to the dominant society is conceived in terms of revolution rather than submission to slow societal deterioration. Revolution occurs when the ability of a society to traverse the stages of social life is thwarted by an inflexible history and time sense. The result is a corresponding thwarting of human potential.

³⁹Rosenstock-Huessy, Out of Revolution, p. 713.

The pedigree of revolutions shows that each tried to realize one neglected and imperilled potentiality of the life-cycle, and stressed its importance by establishing one great national institution to take care of the reproduction of these special processes and types. Each Revolution started permanent cultural processes⁴⁰ to mould a specific character out of plastic humanity.

The progression of revolutions has gone backward from the "conscious re-establishment of 'old age'" (the Church against Rome), to the Russian Revolution which established the "proletarian...the stage of the delocalized emigrant, the boy of twenty, the born revolutionary" (the adolescent). The result: "the list of man's revolutionary personifications, going backwards, shows that the cycle of conscious revolutions is complete. For, back of the adolescent, man lives unconsciously."⁴¹

The immediate question is, What next?

Future revolutionary phases are unavoidable since life is not going to die out immediately on our earth. What will be their form? We have already foreshadowed the answer. With a conscious economic organization of the whole earth, subconscious tribal organizations are needed to protect man's mind from commercialization and disintegration. The more our shrinking globe demands technical and economic co-operation, the more necessary it will prove to restore the balance by admitting⁴² the primitive archetypes of man's nature also.

This was penned in 1938 or before, prophetic at the time, descriptive at this time. We are there. The only

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 714.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., p. 715.

modification to this statement may come in his assertion that life on earth will not die out immediately. Given the depth of our ecological rape of the earth, we may die out very soon, and all this talk of new communities is babble. Response to the ecological crisis must enter into our mutating time sense. We now must seriously contemplate the meaning of "late." It is late.

When we feel the necessity of a specific course of action and the right circumstances arise, the moment is ripe. But that feeling, in relation to new communities and ecological responsibility, cannot arise in the dominant American time sense. We are still the chosen people going on to bigger and better things. The moon is more important than clean air and a balanced eco-system. We must reformulate our sense of time and history before the ecological imperative of "late" has any meaning. This can be accomplished through crisis, which forces a redefinition of our sense of where we are in history and nature. Or, it can be accomplished through communities which develop and share a new critical sense of history which can be communicated through new symbols which redefine the boundaries of our history and thereby its meaning and priorities.

I realize that crisis (a revolution on the part of the natural world) is probably unavoidable given the insensitivity of people. But if Rosenstock-Huessy is

right, and I feel he is, then the next revolution will not be human. We are a one world mankind. But this does not preclude a time when nature itself revolts. Indeed, this would confirm his theory of revolution because in back of the adolescent we have the unconscious, the natural. The basis of the human life-cycle, nature itself has not been considered valuable by societies. It is now nature's turn to revolt. The most we men can do is anticipate it and order our lives accordingly. I would propose this as the most appropriate basis on which to build a new sense of timing and history. The imperative of doing so, of mutating our society to respond to the needs of the ecosystem, is the imperative for new community. As a churchman, I see this as a necessary basis for reformulating community consciousness in the church and its educational approach to where we are in time and space, history and nature.

Hans Huessey, the son of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessey, has written an essay on the relation of the work of his father to psychiatry. Hans Huessey is Assistant Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Vermont. He refers to the need to understand meaningful experience within a time process rather than in static terms.

One could then speak of a phasing and phrasing of an experience and could describe emotional disturbance as a getting stuck in one particular phase of an experience or, perhaps, as due to an attempt to skip an essential phase of an experience. It could also

be described as an inability to enter new experiences. Four basic stages of experience are postulated: (1) inspiration, (2) communication, (3) institutionalization, and (4) history....I would view these meaningful experiences as tying up considerable emotional energy, to borrow from psychoanalytic theory, and that it was essential for us to see these experiences through all four stages so that this emotional energy becomes freed and available for new experiences.⁴³

The Church must assist in the completion of meaningful experiences for its parishioners. It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss the psychological problems and implications of the phases of experience which Hans Huessy describes. It is important, however, to coordinate the times of personal experience, and in this sense, to synchronize distemporaries, to bring the community of the Church together in time as well as space.

The common historical elements we share are our life-cycles, our phases of experience, and the implications of our life-cycle for the social realm. Specifically, we share a time which is best described as "late." The next question needing attention is that concerning how we communicate this new time sense. Why and how must we speak? Without appropriate speech, we have no way of sharing our new time and its imperative for a new space.

In the essay quoted above, Erikson discusses the need for the fields of psychology and history to relate at

⁴³Hans Huessy, "Some Applications to Psychiatry of the Work of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy" (distributed by Argo Books, Norwich, Vermont, July 1965), pp. 5-6.

the point social ethics. I have called the focus of this concern "social time." Social ethics must consider social time in process of evaluating societal directions. The person's life cycle receives its material content from the nature of whatever social period we are in. The quality of life is a product of both, as is social time. Any teaching and learning that takes place must be based on an ethical evaluation of social time. The tools are history and the life cycle. The use of both tools requires intense intellectual and emotional freedom and maturity. In a community, church or intentional community, the discipline of defining and re-defining our social time is the basis of social action responses and teaching.

Methodologically this means a community effort at becoming conscious of "before" and "after." A sense of epoch needs to be established. This means defining the symbols of the generation's present and determining where the starting point of our epoch is and, on the basis of an ethical evaluation of our epoch, where and when it should end. The radicality of a social ethic based on social time is the implied imperative within social time that all stages and periods must undergo birth and death. It is the imperative given in the face of necessary death, both individual and social, that gives the present moment its appropriate agenda. One of the skills necessary to

effectively speak and act out of a temporal ethic is a sense of timing. The same timing which a good entertainer has with his jokes must be cultivated by teachers and active community members. We do have an appropriate word to speak and only if it is done in the right moment. Such a sense of timing must also come from an acute sense of "before" and "after" in between which the right moment lies with pregnancy.

CHAPTER V

ADMINISTRATION IN THE CHURCH

The contemporary Church as exemplified in the local parish is a complex institution which has inherited a rich past and hopes for a glorious future. The Church is the keeper of the Word, the speech of God which articulates salvation for all men. Within its community the intense social time and space of sacramental life takes place. The phrase "takes place" is a usage which is more significant than thought at first sight. When an act of love, such as the celebration of a sacrament "takes place" it literally takes a place within the community. The same is true of the Word. When someone within the community articulates appropriate speech something "takes place." Something happens and the community finds itself together and confronting a reality which is at once the community itself and yet transcends the community. Any attempt to work within this community must be founded on an understanding of institutional life which can encompass its complexity. The complexities of intentionality, usage, social time, history, and formalized institutional space must all be taken into consideration. And above all in approaching the community of the Church, speech must be taken seriously. The most adequate understanding of

institutional life that the author has found thus far is the work of Edgar Schein.

Edgar H. Schein has made a contribution to organizational psychology which is both general in its scope and unique in its application to the ministry. By reading his two books, Organizational Psychology and Process Consultation: Its Role in Organization Development in quick succession one starts with the general issues involved in the "effective utilization of people"¹ and ends with a disengagement from an organization in which he has participated in bringing about its growing self-awareness and ability to recognize and handle its own internal problems. While these two books are not exhaustive in their discussion of the field, the benefit of progressing from theory to a description of practice under the guidance of the same author gives a sense of continuity which is essential to the process of personal appropriation of the meaning of organizational psychology in helping a professional to cope with organizational problems.

In Organizational Psychology Schein starts by giving a brief history of the discipline. The thrust of this history has been from the starting point of a concern

¹Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Psychology (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 1.

to select workers for fixed positions through a concern to design new work situations to the present where all questions must be answered only after the organization as a whole has been considered. The growing sophistication of the social sciences has made possible new insights into the problems of personal and group interaction and growth. Changing technology and the recognition of complexity and multiple causation within social phenomena has made the study of organizations a multi-layered and multiphased problem.² The proper method for using this history is recapitulation rather than transcendence. Old problems are not merely left behind along with their old solutions. Rather, in studying a particular organization, the history of the disciplines dealing with those problems must be recapitulated in deference to the complexity of organizations. It very well may be that an organization may have a traditional problem which is best solved by a traditional solution. But recapitulation also means that even though this traditional approach appears to be in order, all other approaches must be considered seriously. The scope is wholistic, integrative, and philosophical in the sense of being broad.

The necessity of such an outlook at this point in our history has been made clear by a relative outsider to

²Ibid., pp. 2-6.

organizational psychology. Around 1930 Alfred North Whitehead addressed the Harvard Business School and gave clear expression to the historical basis for considering this broad outlook a necessity.

Our sociological theories, our political philosophy, our practical maxims of business, our political economy, our doctrines of education, are derived from an unbroken tradition of great thinkers and of practical examples from the age of Plato in the fifth century before Christ to the end of the last century. The whole of this tradition is warped by the vicious assumption that each generation will substantially live amid the conditions governing the lives of its fathers and will transmit those conditions to mould with equal force the lives of its children. We are living in the first period of human history for which this assumption is false.

...The note of recurrence dominates the wisdom of the past, and still persists in many forms even where explicitly the fallacy of its modern application is admitted. The point is that in the past the time span of important change was considerably longer than that of a single human life. Thus mankind was trained to adapt itself to fixed conditions.

Today this time-span is considerably shorter than that of human life, and accordingly our training must prepare individuals to face a novelty of conditions. But there can be no preparation for the unknown. It is at this point that we recur to the immediate topic, Foresight. We require such an understanding of the present conditions, as may give us some grasp of the novelty which is about to produce a measurable influence on the immediate future. Yet the doctrine, that routine is dominant in any society that is not collapsing, must never be lost sight of. Thus the grounds, in human nature and in the successful satisfaction of purpose, these grounds for the current routine must be understood; and at the same time the sorts of novelty just entering into social effectiveness have got to be weighed against the old routine. In this way the type of modification and the type of

persistance exhibited in the immediate future may be foreseen.³

The application of organizational psychology has still not reached this point but it appears that Whitehead has stated the idea with force and clarity. He touched upon one theme here which underlies Schein's approach to the history of the discipline which Schein does not develop. That theme is the rate of change. The lost paradise of a stable life-time within an even longer time-span concept has given way to the variable concept of rate of change. Time-spans have telescoped into themselves to such an extent that it is more appropriate to our experience to speak of the timing of events. To be ahead or behind the time means death for an organization. The trend of organizational psychology seems to be away from static time-span thinking toward an awareness of what is appropriate, of what is timely for a complex organization. Given this new awareness, a concern to understand dynamic elements in organization has led to the recognition that an organization responds as a whole to its environment. Timing is not merely the sense of what is appropriate to the upper levels of an organizational heirarchy. It is also the pulse of the organization itself, its members as

³ Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York: New American Library, 1933), pp. 99-100.

individuals and as groups. The trend, then, is from structure, to function, to wholeness within time.

Within this historical context arise certain psychological problems which must be met. These problems occur within organizations which Schein defines as follows:

An organization is the rational coordination of the activities of a number of people for the achievement of some common explicit purpose or goal, through division of labor and function, and through a hierarchy of authority and responsibility.⁴

He accents the first predicate:

One important point in this definition which has not yet been discussed is that the object of coordination is activities, not people.⁵ (Attributed to Chester Barnard)

Schein is consciously clearing a middle ground for organizational psychology which is between the extremes of the analysis of social structure and the investigation of the hidden depths of the psyche. These extremes provide a context for activity as does the accelerating rate of change, but it is important for someone, some organization, to tie life together intelligently. It cannot be assumed that integration occurs spontaneously when various specific and channelized disciplines are placed in proximity. It is the activity of purposive human life which accomplishes the integration.

⁴Schein, Organizational Psychology, p. 9.

⁵Ibid.

Thus, the emphasis on activity which Schein demands is profound and necessary.

There are two basic social forms which need to be dealt with, informal and formal organization. Formal organization occurs when explicit goals are pursued by explicit means within explicit patterns of behavior. Informal organization occurs because not all needs are met by formal organizations. It is from the interaction of these two social forms that problems arise.⁶ Several problems arise from the difference between the forms as they express human need and organizational demand. They are roughly as follows:

- (1) problems of recruiting, selecting, training, and allocating human resources;
- (2) problems deriving from the psychological contract between individual and organization...authority...influence;
- (3) problems of integrating the various units of a complex organization...communication and relations among the various informal organizations;
- (4) problems stemming from the needs of the organization to survive, grow, and develop the capacity to adapt to and manage change in a rapidly changing world.

A key concept underlying these problem areas is that broad psychological and intellectual growth aids organizational growth and the ability to diagnose internal problems.⁸

The spirit of Whitehead is smiling. In the following paragraphs I will try to outline Schein's basic thrust in

⁶Ibid., pp. 10-11.

⁷Ibid., p. 20. ⁸Ibid.

dealing with these four problem areas.

The first problem is basically one of personnel and job design. If in selecting personnel the problem is defined as the need to find people to fit the job then a selection model is being used.⁹ If, on the other hand, the needs of individuals as society are considered and then a job is looked for to match these needs, a classification model is being used.¹⁰ Schein's method is to discuss problems inherent in the selection model as a basis for consideration of a systems or classification model.¹¹ There are three basic problem areas in the selection model: (1) finding criteria for selection which correlate with on-the-job efficiency, (2) viewing individuals as static when in fact they are dynamic, and (3) ignoring the ways in which individuals alter the job itself in order to meet personal needs and pressures from the environment. This third point includes the development of informal groups to meet these needs.¹² The traditional approach to these problems has been to simplify the job and its criteria. It has been shown that to the contrary, job enlargement increases motivation by increasing personal autonomy.¹³ The emotional and social

⁹Ibid., p. 22.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid., pp. 27-30.

¹³Ibid., p. 37.

needs of the individual must be considered not only during selection but training as well. In the new job situation a person learns a new task and in addition, is confronted with a new culture, new interpersonal relationships, and new demands which all need to be considered in the training process.¹⁴ From a systems perspective the fact of an uncertain future demands that all avenues of general "self-development"¹⁵ be left open even though immediate effects are not often felt. This presupposes that if autonomy and self-development bear fruit in one area of the organization that it will spread to another. Thus, "the possibility of sharing"¹⁶ becomes essential from the systems perspective. This is in continuity with the Church's concern for openness and intensification within relationship.

The second problem area within organizations is management. The traditional role of management as the coordination of a hierarchy based on a division of labor is retained but redefined from a systems point of view.

There is no one right way for an organization to be managed. Rather, it depends on historical circumstances, the actual mission of the organization, and, most importantly, the fit between management's assumptions about people and the actual characteristics of the organization members.¹⁷

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 39-46.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 47.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 48.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 50.

In practice, this means the working out of a psychological contract based on reciprocity.¹⁸ This can be understood as the process of bringing to consciousness on the part of managers and employees of the respective histories and expectations of both. Ideally, this could be termed dialogue. But in practice it becomes an attempt to understand given the limitations of the explicit goals of the organization. The basic question concerns what kind of power the organization uses to weight its side of the case. Etzioni gives three possibilities for power and employee involvement. The types of power are: (1) coercive, (2) rational-legal authority, and (3) normative reward or intrinsic value. The three corresponding types of employee involvement are: (1) alienative, (2) calculative, and (3) moral.¹⁹ They tend to correspond equally with each other, one to one, two to two, and three to three when in practice. While the above are descriptive of behavior, Schein has gone farther by defining four possible assumptions about people which are possible models in the background of managerial decisions. People are assumed to be the: (1) rational-economic man; (2) social man; (3) self-actualizing man; and (4) complex man. This is the approximate order of their historical

¹⁸Ibid., p. 51.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 52-53.

appearance as basic presuppositions.²⁰ If a manager assumes the first image of man he will worry about the structure of the organization and its incentive plans as solutions to problems.²¹ If he assumes the social image he will adjust group incentives and a sense of belonging and identity.²² If he assumes the self-actualizing image his efforts will be directed toward the individual employee and his need for challenge and meaning.²³ If he holds the image of a complex man he is a philosopher. In terms of strategy he will concern himself with diagnosis based on his valuing of difference in his employees.²⁴ But more, he will be willing to vary his own behavior.²⁵ He is a philosopher with genuine humility. Schein gives historical evidence for these types which I will not recapitulate.

The ability of a manager to value difference and diagnose problems both in himself and the organization are valuable tools in dealing with the third major problem area, groups. Groups are inherent to any organization with a division of labor and functional tasks.²⁶ Schein defines a group as follows:

²⁰Ibid., p. 55.

²²Ibid., p. 59.

²⁴Ibid., p. 70

²⁶Ibid., p. 81.

²¹Ibid., p. 57.

²³Ibid., p. 66.

²⁵Ibid., p. 71.

A psychological group is any number of people who (1) interact with one another, (2) are psychologically aware of one another, and (3) perceive themselves to be a group.

Groups form because they fulfill five basic functions: (1) outlet for affiliation needs, (2) need for sense of identity and self-esteem, (3) a means of reality testing, (4) the increase of security and power, and (5) getting a needed job done.²⁸ In practice, what is needed is communication and value consensus which facilitates the emergence of a climate of trust.²⁹ If a group does form, it has certain norms and develops certain traditions³⁰ which give it an identity over against the larger context. This difference is positive if the manager can deal with difference and negative if the manager or organization tries to destroy the group.

The dynamics of group life in hostile environments has been studied by Sherif and retested by Blake and Mouton. The results of group hostilities in a nutshell are enmity and complacency. Schein concludes that group conflict should be avoided. The key to avoiding conflict seems to lie in communication within the group, from group to group, and from group to organization with an eye to a conscious effort at the integration of groups within

²⁷Ibid.

²⁹Ibid., p. 88.

²⁸Ibid., p. 84.

³⁰Ibid., p. 93.

an over-all organizational thrust which the groups themselves contribute to both in ideas and energy.³¹ Informal groups are the link between individual and organization in the ideal setting. The church, though not an ideal setting, is a setting with ideals. Perhaps a conscious effort to develop the intensity of the tradition within the contemporary setting is possible with groups. The church has committees and age groupings which could be the source of group life: they are in some churches. The problem seems to be that the church has no goal to coordinate groups in their ideas and energy. The group life which springs up when a new church building is being planned, built, and paid for is remarkable. But it is a goal. The church sees its past but not its future. The present becomes a hideous search for something to do. This is to say that there can be no group life without a superordinate goal.³² Even the new life given by a building program or some other short range project pales into insignificance if the situation is placed over against a "Why?" The church seems to be saying that naked existence is a value in itself. This seems the ultimate heresy; no exodus, no eschaton. Group life dynamics are the proof of the heresy. With no exodus, no eschaton, our

³¹Ibid., p. 102.

³²Ibid., p. 99.

basis in time is gone. Our time has literally run out. Our confrontation with an historical identity no longer occurs so we have no need for group life as Christians. We have no Christian basis with which to test reality and again, no need for group life as Christians. We do have affiliation needs and security needs but two out of the five in the list of small group functions is not enough to swing it. The issue I am dealing with is our life as community over-against our life as individual or organization. To stress either of these latter without having the former gives rise to anomie on the one hand and legalistic bureaucracy on the other. The complexity of organizations including the church demands a complex approach to their problems. But if there is any hope it lies in something like process consultation where group life, community life, in its complex relation with individuals and organizational structure is explored openly and with self-enabling concern.

The discussion now enters the fourth problem area which is organizational effectiveness or health. Schein clearly states that a profit motive or the providing of a good does not provide a basis for effectiveness if made the sole criterion. There must be multiple goals and multiple functions.³³ Within the complexity of an

³³Ibid., p. 117.

organization four things must happen for health: (1) adaptation, (2) growth of identity, (3) a testing of reality, and (4) integration of subparts and groups.³⁴ In other words, the organization must cope. This occurs within a cycle, the adaptive-coping cycle which moves as follows:

- (1) Sensing a change in some part of the internal or external environment.
- (2) Importing the relevant information about the change.....
- (3) Changing production or conversion processes.....
- (4) Stabilizing internal changes.....
- (5) Exporting new products, services.....
- (6) Obtaining feedback on the success of the change.....³⁵

This is not a sure-fire formula. It needs the added factor of personal and institutional openness before it will work. It is such an openness and self-awareness which the process consultant helps to bring about.

"Successful coping requires the ability to take in and communicate information...flexibility and creativity... commitment to the goals...an internal climate of support and freedom from threat."³⁶ This is basically what process consultation helps along. Another way of saying it is that process consultation "builds readiness for OD

³⁴Ibid., p. 118.

³⁵Ibid., p. 120.

³⁶Ibid., p. 126.

(organizational development) programs...."³⁷

If organizations were understandable merely in terms of their structure there would be no need for process consultation. But, when a person's style is added to an institutional role which he is assigned something dynamic happens which is best considered as a process rather than a structure. What results is a pattern of relation which becomes a tradition. What the consultant examines are informal relationships, traditions, and the surrounding culture.³⁸ Using the space-time continuum as a method of picturing this process, of the four possible areas of life; the inner, the outer on the space continuum, and the backward, the forward on the time continuum, the consultant explores the inner aspect of personal relation, the outer aspect of culture, and the backward element of tradition. The unknown quantity is the forward element of the temporal continuum. The problem then is the possibility and probability of life beyond the present given, the space-time orientation of the particular organization. Schein discusses six processes which he considers crucial for organization survival. These are the processes which need to be known by the

³⁷ Edgar H. Schein, Process Consultation: Its Role In Organizational Development (Reading: Addison Wesley, 1969), p. 3.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 11.

organization before it can come to any kind of self-awareness. They are: (1) communication, (2) member roles and functions in groups, (3) group problem solving and decision-making, (4) group norms and group growth, (5) leadership and authority, and (6) intergroup cooperation and competition.³⁹

Within these six areas the role of the consultant is to identify and facilitate. Both of these roles take place simultaneously but in a particular fashion. To identify is to have an expertise. But to facilitate is to have expertise plus timing. To be able to be ready to reveal oneself and be able to sense readiness to act in someone else is the crux of this type of consultation.

The success of process consultation depends upon timing. Speaking too early causes the violence perceived aggression on the part of the organization. Speaking too late appears as laziness or ignorance. The key to timing is what Schein calls "joint diagnosis."⁴⁰ The right moment to act occurs when consultant and client reach the same point in their diagnosis. This sense of timing must be passed on in the form of an ability for self diagnosis by the client. Schein deserves credit for dealing with the problem of timing. The rhythm of consultation timing

³⁹Ibid., p. 13

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 7.

comes out in the intervention process.

The first step of the intervention process is that of defining the relationship on formal and psychological grounds. The formal relation is characterized by the freedom to terminate the relation at any time. The psychological relation is a sharing of expectations.⁴¹ The problem of synchronizing expectations is important in the establishment of a common time sense. The psychological contract, in effect, establishes a peculiar social time in which all parties know where the other is tending in time. A social time needs to be supported by a constant and conscious review of intentions. In this way, the range of potential for future restructuring of the organization's social space is established. The freedom of open contact with all group members and a basic trust by all members are also required.⁴² These two points presuppose the conscious sharing of intentions by all parties.

The second step involves the problem of methodology. Timing is important here as well. The setting for observation must be characterized by mutual choice, possession of real power and influence, visible group

⁴¹Ibid., p. 85.

⁴²Ibid., p. 86.

processes, and the presence of real work going on.⁴³ The right time and place for observation depends upon the convergence of a sense of what is appropriate between the consultant and client. A freedom for questioning and two-way communication is important.⁴⁴

At this point a review of the problem of communication is necessary as a basis for understanding the importance of this form of consultation. In assessing the communication within an organization, Schein focuses on two basic points: frequency and duration.⁴⁵ The observer must note the usages which appear and in their respective temporal contexts of frequency and duration. The assumption is that important language and gesture as well as pathological forms are communicated more often and for a longer time than the less important. Organizations are built of mediated relationships, the medium being the full spectrum of human language and expression. The relative health of an organization depends upon the fit of its communication to the job and to the styles of the individuals that compose it.


In between the extremes of individual style and corporate task lies the subgroup. Insofar as communication is the key to health and subgroups are the basis of

⁴³Ibid., pp. 89-90.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 91.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 15.

possible communication, the subgroup is also the key to organizational health. The patterns of communication within subgroups form networks which either facilitate or inhibit meaningful communication. In attempting to work with such patterns, Schein has adopted the model of the "Johari window."



- A: Open communication
- B: Leakage or unwitting revelations
- C: Confiding or "levelling"
- D: Emotional contagion

Fig. 3.2 Types of messages in a two-person communication situation

Let us now consider two people in interaction with each other (Fig. 3.2) and analyze the implications of the different kinds of messages and different levels of communication which occur. Most communication occurs between the two open selves of the persons (Arrow A), and most popularized analyses of the communication process confine themselves to this level.

A second level of communication is the signals or meanings which we pick up from a person's blind self and which he is unaware of sending (Arrow B).

A third level of communication occurs when we deliberately reveal something which we ordinarily tend to conceal (Arrow C). Ordinarily we think of this as "confiding" in someone or "levelling" if we are sharing reactions or feelings generated by immediate events.

Finally, there is a less common but no less important level of communication represented by Arrow D which might best be labeled "emotional contagion." One person influences the feelings of another without either one's being consciously aware of the origin of the feeling. Sometimes the feeling which is aroused

in the recipient mirrors that of the sender, as when tension which may be denied by the sender nevertheless makes the receiver tense as well. In other cases the feeling is different, as when a denied but displayed feeling in one person causes tension in the other because he does not know whether he should respond to the manifest level of communication (the denial of feeling) or to the latent level (the actually displayed feeling).⁴⁶

Types of communication B and C are problematic for groups. Leakage shows a lack of timing. Confiding may be seen as too personal and threatening to other group members. Type D, emotional contagion, may bring the group to solidarity but it is uncontrollable. Type A, open communication, shows good timing. Two or more people are open at the same time.

Upon this typology must be superimposed an awareness of filtering processes in communication. Schein summarizes them as follows:

- (a) Self-image
- (b) Image of the other person or persons
- (c) Definition of situation
- (d) Motives, feeling, intentions, attitudes
- (e) Expectations⁴⁷

All of these factors plus the typology of communication are used to describe the group process of communication as a whole. Seeing the wholistic life of the group allows for insight into how the group facilitates or inhibits communication on the basis of group style. It is assumed

⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 22, 24-25.

⁴⁷Ibid., pp. 26-28.

that the adjustment of group style will create adjustment in the system as a whole if allowed to develop by those in power. It might be said that such small groups are helped to become communities of conscious intention: intentional communities. Out of group styles come three basic coping patterns.

1. basically tough aggressive coping,
2. basically tender, support-seeking coping, and
3. withdrawal⁴⁸ behavior based on denial of any feelings.

The importance of these patterns lies in their level of ritualization in a group. The pattern of group life when extended in time and with a stability in membership will tend to become a ritual in which the history of the group and its expectations bear great similarity. This can be good or bad depending on the effect of the ritual upon the organization. The circularity of such ritual is a threat to the ability of the group to contribute to the coping of the institution. Such ritual is of patterns of response while coping depends upon an ability to create new patterns. Patterns are secondary to that element in group life which allows new patterns to arise in continuity with the old. The ability to endure time is the basis of coping. An institution must have a temporal style which is free to discard and create whatever spacial

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 34.

arrangements of institutional life are required. The question is then to define temporal style in organizational terms.

At this point several elements converge. The phase of process consultation being discussed is that of method selection. The theoretical phase being discussed is communication. The question which arises is that of temporal style. The problem which forms the background of the question is that of change in patterns of response and communication. This is the crucial point at which the process of consultation can make its most important contribution to an organization. Specifically, an additional aspect in the method of communication analysis could be a concern for a critical examination of linguistic usages which are no longer potent enough to carry the complexity of thinking and feeling across to other group members. The concern to study frequency and duration is a first step in such a linguistic critique. I would carry this further to an analysis of phrases, sentences, and whole segments of speech. This concern is in harmony with the analysis of response patterns. It carries the study of response patterns into patterns of speech as well. A typology of communication is not sufficient as a basis for an analysis of response and communication patterns. Schein recognizes this in his overall scheme of studying the structure of communication

in the group. He does not extend the analysis to the structure of personal speech but provides a framework for such a study.

The importance of analyzing personal speech patterns consciously lies in the assumption that organizational life is mediated and not immediate. The medium is speech, meaning the full spectrum of human language and gesture. Speech establishes relations. In order to study relations, one ought to study the speech in those relations. This is not to say that a verbatim typed copy of a conversation is the goal. Speech is alive when it happens, dead otherwise. This suggests that in choosing a method of approach that speech be a prime consideration. As summarized above, two-way communication is important in process consultation. But beyond this, a person's and a group's speech can reveal the way they endure time and change by noting the tendencies in speech. Schein helps this type of analysis in his discussion of task and group-maintenance functions of group members.⁴⁹ Task functions are mainly those acts which make a particular social interchange efficient and productive. Maintenance functions are mainly acts which accomodate individual members and their perspectives. In describing temporal style I would analyze speech functions. These include

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 39.

usages, tense preference, reliance on formula, mode of speech such as experiential or hortatory. Such analysis would include a patterning of speech exchanges according to mode. The resultant overall pattern would be descriptive of the flow of content, mode, and tense over the period of one meeting session. Out of a repetition of such patternings of one group a sense of fit and appropriateness of certain individual and group speech patterns could be developed. Then a sense of group timing could be consciously tested and refined. Ritual is one form of group timing. Some specific form will be required in specific group situations. It may be found that the role of a group in an organization is so demanding, for instance, that it must run at less than peak efficiency in its timing or its members will burn out. In such a case, timely and anachronistic communication are both required for a healthy mix. Most important is the need for each group to develop its own timing.

After communication has been analyzed and the intermediate step of speech analysis has taken place, the problems of defining group functional roles will take on the added depth of role plus timing. The result of this combination is temporal style.

Following the second stage in process consultation, method selections, comes the third, data

gathering.⁵⁰ While analysis of communication is a form of data gathering, I would prefer to distinguish between style definition and data gathering. Style definition would include a complete understanding of group dynamics. Data gathering would include a summary of the different contents handled by the group within its dynamic life. Data gathering would include more of a concern for the fit between group function and organization function. Concerns needing attention in this area would be problem solving and decision making in terms of organizational problems and decisions. The group may have a completely different method of handling informal problems and decisions which pertain only to the group.

The complexity of decision making, group norms and growth, and leadership and authority is such that a distinction between style and organizational fit, or traditionally, informal and formal, will help the consultant to solve style specific problems without having to be overly concerned with its relation to organizational fit. The concern would be for developing a group that can effectively and consciously mutate its style to fit the timing of its members as they deal with organizational problems, the organizational problems being the resource

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 97.

upon which the group acts. Such intentional mutation would be beyond the scope of possibility for most groups. But the realization that mutation of group norms, patterning, and organizational fit are always changing may induce some group to at least pay more attention to temporal style.

After the group has been studied, diagnosis and intervention can take place. All of these phases of consultation may be intertwined in different progressions such that no one method of consultation is necessarily more correct.⁵¹ Generally speaking, the overall goal of consultation is the consciousness of their processes by group members. The four basic areas of intervention are:

- 1) agenda setting through questions, through process analysis periods, through meetings devoted to interpersonal and group process, and through theory inputs on various process issues;
- 2) various kinds of feedback sessions to individuals or groups, based either on observed data or data obtained in interviews;
- 3) coaching or counseling which occurs either in specific sessions devoted to that purpose or as a part of an on-going interaction in a group; and
- 4) structural suggestions pertaining to process oriented meetings⁵² or other parts of the consultation project.

After the appropriate interventions are made, disengagement follows an evaluation, both being based on a principle of mutuality where all conclusions and decisions to disengage are open to group influence.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 78.

⁵²Ibid., p. 122.

While the minister of a church is not merely a process consultant, the wide scope of process consultation is valuable in enriching group life within the broader organization of the church. The scope of a concern for group process goes beyond that of individual or group counseling where individual problems are the focus. Process consultation includes a concern for the group as an entity. The real concern is for a group to become itself fully. If that happens, the individuals also realize their potential in that the basic group is only as rich as its members. Some members will feel constrained while others may feel overburdened, but the overall importance of a community is acute enough that individuals will grow from the constraint and burden of the group life. Persons in a group are compelled to recognize the multiformity of human life which individuals can often avoid on their own. The mutuality of group life helps individuals to integrate their identities with others rather than merely asserting their personal styles. Some identities of persons may be too fragile for intense group life. These people should be encouraged if shy, confronted if aggressive. The central assumption behind this concern for community is that human personality depends upon human social intercourse for growth. The more intense the intercourse, the more the growth if I may be simplistic at this point. Another assumption being

made is that human identity is multiform and not uniform. Human identity is not fully present in one pattern of response but in man, all of which are mutating. Human life is complex.

The complexity of human life can be fully mediated to another person through language which has enough life in it to fit that complexity. In retrospect, this gives the added concern for speech functions outlined above an importance as the variable factor in any discussion of specific group relations. However, much more work has to be done in the field of a science of functional speech towards providing specific working definitions.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

"Say kids, what time is it?" Buffalo Bob was a prophet. He used to ask the above question at the beginning of each Howdy Doody Show. The Church must ask itself the same question and consciously establish its social time. It must examine its usages and establish its social sapce. We must speak the answer to these questions rather than assume them. The act of speaking is that through which we maintain our social time and space. The act of love is the product of our community which we establish. The problem of establishing and adjusting our social space and time is not a mere exercise in self awareness. It means that we create and recreate our community life as a Church, we build, destroy, rebuild. In this sense the Church is always in search of an alternate form of community, an alternate to what it just was.

In the unfolding of a specific use of process consultation in the Church an effort needs to be made toward integrating the historical background of the Church as a source of normative correction to the alternatives which the specific parish may consider as an alternative form. Process consultation within the Church must take

seriously this normative aspect of the Church's past. It also must consider the intimate relation of the human life cycle to the work of the Church. The Church's process of sustaining human life is multiform and multi-timed. The product of the Church is the whole human being who can express his wholeness with vital speech and act. Because of the diversity inherent in this task the scope of the institutional Church in its community structure must give priority to time rather than space. Our history as a "We" and our common concern for the integrity of the life cycle forms our inclusive scope. Our common space, our act of love and our usages with which we understand our relation to one another must be derived from and accountable to our corporate sense of social time. Process consultation within the Church must include this concern for the inclusive norm of the Church's social time.

The vital role which process consultation can take in the Church is that of helping parishioners see what time it is and whether or not community life is keeping the right time. The tasks of an institution take time to perform. Thus there is a dual aspect to the community's time. Where are they in time and how are they using the time they have? Process consultation assists in helping the institution to use its time well. This is very important for an industrial corporation and for the Church but in different ways. In both, effective

communication is the key. Vital speech saves time as well as creating it. For an industrial corporation the production process and its specific time required for completion of the transformation of raw material to finished product is determined by the coordination of the corporate system through communication. The Church has a different problem with time in its attempt to give wholeness to life. It must be concerned with its normative history and the life cycle as suggested above. But in order to allow the appropriation of its social time the Church must concern itself with the individual's timing as well. Timing is not just a form of an institutional expression of what it thinks most important at the time. The time of the person must synchronize with that of the institution and vice versa.

The Church must ask each person what time it is for him. It must understand its own sense of time well enough to understand the individual's expression of his sense of where he is in time in relation to the corporate sense of time. The Church has two duties in relation to the individual's time. First, it must allow him the vision of the spectrum in which his time shades from one part of history into another. This is the task of bringing to consciousness the richness and intensity of the Church's remembered past and its hoped for future. Second, it must help the individual complete his times.

This second task has not been discussed thus far in this paper and will only briefly be discussed in this concluding section but its importance is extreme.

The conclusion of this discussion of speech, time, and space in the community of the Church must be found in an appreciation of the complexity of the Church. The Church is multiform and dynamic. Yet within this complexity we can come together in the real unity of synchronized moments. It is an institution in which there must always be a place and time for the expression of diversity which is not merely harmonized away by an assumed uniformity of the nature of Church life. The acts of love and speech can support the basic multiformity of man if only people will trust them. In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was incarnate because God loved us. God's Word and Love were manifest in one act, the gift of his Son. The Church celebrates this act. It must appropriate it as well. It must synchronize its distemporal life. It must speak its vital word and act out its ministering love.

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